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Abstract 
In human neuroscientific research, there has been an increasing interest in how the brain 
computes the value of an anticipated outcome. However, evidence is still missing about which 
valuation related brain regions are modulated by the proximity to an expected goal and the 
previously invested effort to reach a goal. The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the 
effects of goal proximity and invested effort on valuation related regions in the human brain.  
We addressed this question in two fMRI studies by integrating a commonly used reward 
anticipation task in differential versions of a Multitrial Reward Schedule Paradigm. In both 
experiments,  subjects  had  to  perform  consecutive  reward  anticipation  tasks  under  two 
different  reward contingencies: in the delayed condition, participants received a monetary 
reward  only  after  successful  completion  of  multiple  consecutive  trials.  In  the  immediate 
condition, money was earned after every successful trial. 
In the first study, we could demonstrate that the rostral cingulate zone of the posterior 
medial frontal cortex signals action value contingent to goal proximity, thereby replicating 
neurophysiological findings about  goal proximity signals in a homologous region in non-
human primates. The findings of the second study imply that brain regions associated with 
general  cognitive  control  processes  are  modulated  by  previous  effort  investment. 
Furthermore, we found the posterior lateral prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex to be 
involved in coding for the effort-based context of a situation.  
In sum,  these  results  extend the role of the human rostral  cingulate zone in  outcome 
evaluation to the continuous updating of action values over a course of action steps based on 
the proximity to the expected reward. Furthermore, we tentatively suggest that previous effort 
investment invokes processes under the control of the executive system, and that posterior 
lateral prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex are involved in an effort-based context 
representation that can be used for outcome evaluation that is dependent on the characteristics 
of the current situation. 
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1  Introduction 
 
It is a key focus of current research in cognitive neuroscience how the brain computes 
value. This is not surprising considering the fact that value computations build the fundaments 
for all kinds of voluntary choice behavior, ranging from basic animal foraging decisions to 
complex human decisions, such as trading in the stock market.  
In  a  recent  model  of  value-based  decision  making,  Rangel  and  colleagues  (Rangel, 
Camerer, & Montague, 2008) proposed two basic processes contributing to the computation 
of value. On the one hand, the brain needs to determine internal states of the organism (e.g., 
hunger level), as well as external states of the environment (e.g., the price range of available 
options), which might represent a reference frame for the evaluation of the expected outcome. 
Apart from this reference dependent valuation mechanism, the brain must process so-called 
decision variables such as benefits, costs and risks associated with each alternative in order to 
enable  efficient  selection  between  those  alternatives.  In  general,  most  neuro-cognitive 
research  on  decision  making  is  concerned  with  investigating  the  influence  of  decision 
variables  like  reward  size,  probability  of  reward,  delay  of  reward,  and  expected  effort, 
respectively.  However,  thus  far,  almost  no  evidence  has  been  provided  for  the  decision 
variables of increasing reward proximity and the previously invested effort to obtain a reward. 
This is surprising considering that a) monkeys‟ posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) was 
shown  to  be  highly  specialized  in  coding  for  increasing  reward  proximity  (Shidara  & 
Richmond, 2002), and that b) the increase in the subjective value perception due to previous 
effort expenditure is a common research objective in fields like social psychology (e.g., Arkes 
& Ayton, 1999; Strough, Mehta, McFall, & Schuller, 2008). 
It is the aim of the present thesis to show for the first time that increasing goal proximity 
and  previous  effort  investment  can  also  modulate  valuation  related  regions  in  the  human 
brain.  To  this  end,  we  conducted  two  functional  imaging  studies  integrating  a  monetary 
delayed response task into different versions of a multitrial reward schedule paradigm. In the 
first study, we set out to replicate neurophysiological findings in monkeys about the role of 
the caudal motor area (CMA) in the pMFC in signaling increasing reward proximity. In the 
second study, we investigated the influence of previous effort investment on neuronal activity 
and  behavioral  performance.  Through  accordant  modifications  of  the  multitrial  reward   Introduction       
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schedule paradigm, we investigated the influence of previous workload both in terms of a 
decision variable accumulating over action steps as well as in terms of a reference frame for 
relative value computation.  
In the following, I will first give an introduction in the concepts and neurobiology of 
reference  dependent  valuation  mechanisms.  Then  I  will  shortly  describe  the  experimental 
approaches  and  associated  brain  responses  of  frequently  investigated  decision  variables. 
Afterwards I will introduce the concepts of goal proximity and invested effort together with 
their  operationalization  used  in  the  present  thesis  to  analyze  their  influence  on  neuronal 
activity and behavioral performance. In the following experimental sections, the two studies 
will  be  described  in  detail.  In  the  last  section,  the  findings  from  both  studies  will  be 
summarized and critically discussed.  
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2  Theoretical Background 
 
There are two processes that result in a representation of the desirability of an anticipated 
outcome. One is the valuation mechanism based on the context in which equivalent choices 
are presented. It is also referred to as reference dependent valuation mechanisms (Clithero & 
Smith, 2009). The other one is concerned with the so-called “decision variables” (Stephens & 
Krebs, 1986). Notably, the evaluation of expected outcomes is performed even in the absence 
of any immediate necessity to choose and in a way that is also relevant for free-choice trials 
(Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, & Montague, 2001).  
 
2.1  Context Dependent Valuation 
Although value has generally been viewed as an absolute measure (e.g., expected value, 
the  summed  product  of  objective  decision  variables  reward  size  and  probability),  much 
evidence  suggests  that  value  is  often  computed  in  relative  terms,  i.e.,  with  respect  to  a 
reference point, rather than in isolation. The susceptibility to such reference points can easily 
be demonstrated by questions like: “Would you be willing to pay more for a new television 
the same day you bought a new house?”, or similarly “Would you be more likely to purchase 
that television if it was marked on sale?”. Most individuals respond affirmatively to questions 
of this form, likely because they make use of contextual anchors to determine the value of an 
option.  
 
2.1.1  Framing and Relative Value Coding  
This  aspect  of  human  behavior  is  called  “framing”.  Framing  describes  the  process 
whereby the choice made is  influenced by the manner or  context  in which the choice is 
presented.  Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979)  originally  described  this  context  or  reference 
dependent  value  computation  as  a  key  aspect  of  prospect  theory,  a  model  of  choice  that 
predicts different preferences for equivalent outcomes that are framed either as gains or as 
losses. More specifically, people are more motivated to avoid losses than to make gains,   Theoretical Background       
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indicating that they assign higher values to potential losses than to equivalent potential gains. 
This is why prospect theory is also known as “loss-aversion theory”. Another paradigmatic 
example of reference dependent computation of value that has a dramatic impact on financial 
transactions within real markets is the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980). This phenomenon 
refers to an observation whereby subjects value a good they own substantially more than an 
identical  good  that  is  available  for  purchase.  Taken  together,  people  attribute  value  as  a 
change from a set reference point, which means they commonly judge options and prices in 
relative terms (e.g., Seymour & McClure, 2008). Findings like these also stimulated research 
about mechanisms underlying value assignment in the brain.  
Recent  studies  in  neuroscience  implicate  regions  in  the  orbitofrontal  cortex  (OFC), 
striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in the construction of relative value 
(Seymour & McClure, 2008). Particularly the orbitofrontal cortex has a well-studied role in 
general  reward  processing  (Padoa-Schioppa  &  Assad,  2006).  Initial  evidence  for  relative 
value coding in this region came from a classic experiment by Tremblay and Schultz (1999), 
who  presented  monkeys  with  variously  preferred  juice  rewards,  and  recorded  from 
orbitofrontal neurons while presenting each juice, presented in blocks with one other juice. 
Critically, neuronal activity depended on whether or not the juice was the preferred one in that 
block, rather than its absolute value. Comparable findings have also been found in human 
medial orbitofrontal cortex, using an analogous design in an fMRI study (Elliot, Agnew, & 
Deakin,  2008).  Furthermore,  OFC  activity  declines  for  a  reward  (or  cues  that  predict  a 
reward) when an individual (human or monkey) is sated with that reward (Chritchley & Rolls, 
1996; Gottfried, O‟Doherty, & Dolan, 2003), analogous to the perceived subjective decline in 
value. The representation of value in the OFC is additionally sensitive to the available choices 
in  a  given  context,  i.e.,  to  the  range  of  values  presented  in  a  specific  condition  (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2009), further underlining its crucial role in relative value coding. 
 
2.1.2  Cognitive Representation of Context Information 
Also from a cognitive perspective on adaptive and flexible behavior, it could be more 
beneficial to code each stimulus according to the context in which the stimulus is presented, 
than to code only its physical properties. Recent evidence amply demonstrates that neurons in 
the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) are involved in coding the stimulus depending on the   Theoretical Background       
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context of the situation (Sakagami & Niki 1994; White & Wise 1999; Watanabe & Sakagami, 
2007). For example, cognitive context-representing neuronal activities have been reported in a 
multitask situation, in which LPFC activity depended solely on which rule was currently in 
effect (Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001). Also in human subjects, the posterior LPFC (post-
LPFC) was related to the selection of task sets according to contextual signals (Brass & von 
Cramon,  2004).  In  line  with  this,  according  to  a  series  of  experiments  by  Koechlin  and 
colleagues  (Koechlin,  Basso,  Pietrini,  Panzer,  &  Grafman,  1999;  Koechlin,  Ody,  & 
Kouneiher, 2003; Kouneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009), contextual control in humans is 
subserved by posterior LPFC regions (typically, Brodmann‟s areas (BAs) 9/44/45). In their 
opinion, the cognitive context effect, i.e., the context-dependent coding of stimuli, may result 
from the engagement of posterior LPFC regions in maintaining task sets in working memory 
over a temporal episode. 
In  monkeys‟  LPFC,  there  are  also  neurons  that  code  stimuli  on  the  basis  of  the 
motivational context. For example, Watanabe and Sakagami (2007) found that in response to 
an instruction cue indicating absence of reward, LPFC neurons not only predicted the absence 
of reward but also represented more specifically which kind of reward would be omitted in a 
given  trial.  These  neurons  seem  to  represent  the  motivational  context  information  in 
differential baseline activities as a function of the reward context. Because the LPFC receives 
highly processed motivational information from the orbitofrontal cortex and highly processed 
cognitive information from the posterior association cortices (Barbas, 1993), the integration of 
cognitive and motivational context information might occur in the LPFC, and the integrated 
information might be used as a top-down signal for adaptive goal-directed behavior. 
Taken  together,  while  OFC  is  predominantly  concerned  with  processing  value  with 
reference to the motivational context, LPFC seems to play important roles in integrating the 
cognitive  and  motivational  context  information  in  order  to  be  able  to  select  appropriate 
responses according to a given situation. 
 
 
 
   Theoretical Background       
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13 
 
2.2  Common Decision Variables 
 
2.2.1   Reward Size 
Apart  from  the  characteristics  of  the  current  situation,  individuals  are  guided  by  the 
expected mean value of the potential outcomes when deciding between choice options (e.g., 
Schultz,  2004).  Correspondingly,  the  most  obvious  variable  influencing  decisions  is  the 
reward  size  of  the  expected  decision  outcome.  Neurons  in  several  brain  structures  show 
stronger  activation  when  comparing  rewarded  with  unrewarded  trials.  These  structures 
include  the  striatum  (Hollerman,  Tremblay,  &  Schultz,  1998;  Knutson,  Adams,  Fong,  & 
Hommer,  2001),  the  dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex  (Kobayashi,  Lauwereyns,  Koizumi, 
Sakagami, & Hikosaka, 2002), the medial prefrontal cortex (Matsumoto, Suzuki, & Tanaka, 
2003), the orbitofrontal cortex (Trembley & Schultz, 2000), and the dopaminergic midbrain 
(Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001; Kawagoe, Takikawa, & Hikosaka, 2004). Some neurons 
in  motor  regions  of  the  frontal  lobe,  such  as  premotor  cortex,  frontal  eye  fields,  and 
supplementary  eye  fields  also  show  enhanced  activity  with  increasing  reward  magnitude, 
which  could  be  related  to  the  movement  changes  induced  by  rewards  (Roesch  &  Olson, 
2003).  
However, in decision making situations of everyday behavior, when we choose between 
options and engage in courses of actions, we do not only have to decide according to reward 
size, but also according to a variety of additional decision variables that mostly devalue the 
expected  outcome.  In  the  following,  I  will  discuss  alterations  of  the  reward  signals  by 
temporal delay, probability, and expected effort concerning a reward. I will also review how 
these variables influence choice behavior, as the subjective values that decision makers assign 
to outcomes are measured objectively in choice preference. Despite the growing interest in the 
neural correlates of decision making, however, it is not fully clear how these three additional 
decision variables of interest are represented and to which extent they are encoded by distinct 
neuronal populations. 
 
2.2.2  Probability 
The  expected  mean  values  of  decision  outcomes  are  additionally  influenced  by  their 
associated degrees of probability (e.g., Schultz et al., 2008). Current views distinguish two   Theoretical Background       
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forms of probability, namely “risk” und “ambiguity”, depending on whether the probability 
distributions of outcomes are known or unknown. 
The most direct way to investigate neural coding of risk is by comparing responses to 
stimuli with different reward probabilities. Across numerous studies, key areas involved in 
risky decision making include lateral prefrontal cortex (Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & 
Platt, 2006b), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 
2007),  and  posterior  parietal  cortex  (Huettel,  Song,  &  McCarthy,  2005;  Huettel,  2006a). 
Fiorillo, Tobler, and Schultz (2003) showed that the responses of dopamine neurons to reward 
attainment  monotonically  decreased  with  increasing  reward  probability,  and,  conversely, 
responses to the predictive stimulus monotonically increased. In contrast to that, Hsu and 
colleagues  (Hsu,  Krajbich,  Zhao,  &  Camerer,  2009)  identified  neuronal  activity  in  the 
striatum  during  valuation  of  monetary  gambles  to  be  nonlinear  at  the  extreme  tails  of  a 
probability distribution. Also behaviorally, the commonly observed linearity in responses to 
probability breaks down for very high and low probabilities in a systematic manner (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992), i.e., small probabilities are overweighted while high probabilities are 
underweighted.  
Another point that is still a matter of debate is whether or not there are brain regions 
capable of integrating reward size with risk. Recent findings suggest that a region in mid-
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex aggregates risk and reward magnitude signals into a common 
value  signal  that  even  varied  with  subjective  risk  attitude  of  the  participants  naturally 
modulating value perception (Tobler, Christopoulos, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009). Of 
note, the integrated reward signal was not restricted to choices, but occurred also in choice-
free (imperative) situations.  
A smaller set of studies have examined the effects of ambiguity, or unknown probabilities, 
upon  decision  making  and  the  associated  valuation  process.  The  orbitofrontal  and  the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are engaged in these situations. When Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Camerer (2005) presented decision problems to participants in an fMRI experiment, 
they  found  that  lateral  orbitofrontal  cortex  exhibited  significantly  greater  activation  to 
decisions involving ambiguity compared to decisions involving risk. A similar approach was 
used by Huettel and colleagues (2006b) who observed ambiguity related activation in the 
post-LPFC.  This  activation  was  predicted  by  ambiguity  preference  and  was  negatively 
correlated with an independent clinical measure of behavioral impulsiveness. This led the   Theoretical Background       
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authors  to  the  conclusion  that  this  region  implements  contextual  analysis  and  inhibits 
impulsive responses, in accordance with the demands of an ambiguous situation.  
In  many  real-life  problems  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty,  however,  decision 
makers  are  required  to  adjust  their  decision  making  strategies  based  on  the  value  of  the 
outcomes of their previous choices. This adaptive process is formally accounted for by the 
reinforcement  learning  theory  (Sutton  &  Barto,  1998).  Value  anticipation  in  this  field 
represents  the  empirical  estimates  of  possible  outcomes  expected  from  several  previous 
actions.  During  a  sequence  of  choices  the  value  of  the  actions  is  continually  updated 
according to the experience of the decision maker. Numerous studies imply that the anterior 
cingulate cortex has a special role in this respect. After an ACC lesion, only the outcome of 
the  most  recent  trial  exerts  any  influence  over  subsequent  decisions  (Kennerley,  Walton, 
Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006) and the decision parameter of uncertainty correlates 
with the BOLD response in the ACC at the time the new outcome is observed which is the 
crucial time for learning (Behrens et al., 2007).  
 
2.2.3  Temporal Delay 
Uncertainty  can also  be induced by increasing  the delay before  a reward  is  received, 
which  also  leads  subjects  to  devalue  potential  rewards.  The  time-dependent  valuation  of 
rewards is typically investigated using intertemporal choice tasks in which subjects have to 
choose between options that vary according to reward size and associated delays. On the basis 
of choice preferences, person-specific discount functions are established, i.e., the rate at which 
the subjective reward value decreases as a function of the delay until the reward is given.  
Typically,  the  subjective  reward  value  declines  in  a  hyperbolic  manner  during 
intertemporal  choice  tasks,  i.e.,  it  exhibits  a  rapid  decay  in  the  beginning  and  flattens 
gradually with increasing delay-to-reward (Schultz, 2010). Particularly the neuronal activity 
in the striatum seems to track the subjective value of a delayed monetary reward (Kable & 
Glimcher, 2007). Further brain regions involved in the temporal discounting of reward value 
include the principal reward structures, namely the dopamine system and orbitofrontal cortex 
(Cardinal, Pennicott, Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001; Roesch, Calu, & Schoenbaum, 
2007a). In monkeys, also premotor cortical neurons show lower firing rates following visual 
cues  indicating  a  delay  in  reward  (Roesch  &  Olson,  2005).  The  decreases  in  premotor   Theoretical Background       
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responses also correlate well with slower behavioral reactions, indicating that the decrease in 
neuronal response may reflect a reduction in general motivation through delays, rather than 
reduced reward value per se.  
A fraction of neurons in monkeys‟ dorsolateral prefrontal cortex also show delay related 
reductions in choice experiments (Kim, Hwang, Seo, & Lee, 2009). However, in humans, 
posterior LPFC activity in delayed-reward tasks does not vary with expected reward value in 
a simple way (Tanaka et al., 2004). Therefore, it may not be important for representing the 
distant  reward  value  itself.  Instead,  posterior  LPFC  activity  is  thought  to  represent  the 
environmental states, and uncertainty about those states, during progression toward a distant 
reward.   
Aiming  to  distinguish  neural  responses  categorically  between  immediate  and  later 
rewards,  it  was  proposed  that  the  temporal  discounting  of  decision  options  reflects  two 
processes: an impulsive system (β) that rapidly devaluates rewards that are not immediately 
attainable, and a patient system (δ) that exhibits much more gradual discounting (McClure, 
Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Moreover, relative activation of these two sets of 
brain regions can predict actual choice behavior (McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & 
Cohen, 2007). The studies of McClure and colleagues suggest that the β-system comprises 
reward-related regions including the ventral striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
whereas the δ-system includes cognitive regions like lateral prefrontal  and lateral parietal 
cortices, i.e., areas related to executive control (e.g., Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 
2005;  Wager,  Jonides,  &  Reading,  2004)  that  are  commonly  associated  with  deliberative 
cognitive processes including future planning. Thus far, it has not been investigated whether 
or  not  these  putatively  distinct  decision  systems  might  also  be  involved  in  value 
representation  when  available  options  vary  according  to  other  motivational  aspects  than 
temporal delay. 
Taken  together,  reward-related  neuronal  responses  undergo  temporal  as  well  as 
probabilistic discounting in a number of brain structures, suggesting that reward coding might 
be a rather widespread phenomenon in many brain regions representing value information.  
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2.2.4  Expected Effort 
Furthermore, human decision makers show a tendency to avoid making decisions that are 
computationally demanding and subjectively effortful (McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). Other 
species also seem to take energetic expenditure into account when making foraging decisions 
(Bautista, Tinbergen, & Kacelnik, 2001). The degree to which effortfully obtained rewards 
are devalued may depend on the ecological niche occupied by a particular species (Stevens, 
Rosati,  Ross,  &  Hauser,  2005).  Interestingly,  a  comparative  study  of  primate  species 
demonstrates that a willingness to tolerate delay costs does not correlate with an inclination to 
exert more effort, i.e., to travel farer to obtain greater reward (Long & Platt, 2005). This 
suggests that the two types of decision costs, i.e., delay and effort, are also represented by 
different cortical regions.  
Aiming to distinguish the influence of temporal delay and expected effort on decision 
making, Rudebeck and colleagues (Rudebeck, Walton, Smyth,  Bannerman, &  Rushworth, 
2006) found out that orbitofrontal cortical lesions affected how long rats decided to wait for 
rewards. Conversely, anterior cingulate cortex lesions affected how much effort rats decided 
to invest for rewards. Furthermore, top-down signals from ACC to nucleus accumbens and 
midbrain  DA  cells  may  be  vital  for  overcoming  effort-related  response  costs  (Walton, 
Kennerley, Bannerman, Phillips, & Rushworth, 2006). Anterior cingulate cortex is implicated 
in the making of cost-benefit decisions also in humans. In a recent study (Croxson, Walton, 
O'Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009) subjects were scanned while they performed a series 
of effortful  actions  to  obtain rewards that varied in  magnitude. The putamen and several 
premotor and motor regions in the posterior medial frontal cortex were influenced by effort 
expectation independent of reward magnitude. Only activity in the dorsal ACC (dACC) also 
reflected the interaction of both expected reward and expected effort costs. This is further 
underlining the region‟s crucial role in guiding effort-based cost-benefit valuation, which may 
be a consequence of its role in representing the relationship between actions and outcomes 
(Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004). 
While the ACC or OFC may be selectively concerned with the processing of delay or 
effort costs, respectively, neither type of decision depends on either frontal region in isolation. 
Kennerley  and colleagues  (Kennerley, Dahmubed,  Lara,  & Wallis, 2009a) simultaneously 
recorded the activity of multiple single neurons in the frontal cortex while monkeys made 
choices involving the payoff of a choice, the probability the choice will yield a particular   Theoretical Background       
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18 
 
outcome, and the cost in time and effort to obtain an outcome. Neurons in the ACC, OFC, and 
DLPFC encoded the value related to all of these decision variables. There was no evidence 
that  specific  areas  of  the  frontal  cortex  were  specialized  for  processing  specific  decision 
variables. However, there was a specialization of function with relation to the number of 
decision variables encoded. Neurons that encoded a single decision variable were equally 
prevalent throughout the frontal cortex, whereas neurons that encoded two or more decision 
variables were significantly more common in the ACC compared to the OFC and LPFC.  
In general, it is still a matter of debate whether or not value coding involves mechanisms 
that are specific to the type of decision variables that are evaluated. During decision making, 
valuation  of  different  domains  of  decision  variables  may  involve  partially  distinct,  i.e., 
domain-specific,  neural  systems  (Ballard  &  Knutson,  2009).  On  the  other  hand,  efficient 
choice behavior potentially requires a common neural coding of stimulus value. In line with 
this, some researchers suggest a mechanism for the neural coding of subjective value in the 
human  brain  that  is  based  on  the  combination  of  domain-specific  and  domain  general 
valuation  networks,  with  domain  general  activation  networks  being  identified  through 
overlapping activation in response to differential decision variables (Peters & Buchel, 2009).  
 
2.3  The  Influence  of  Goal  Proximity  and  Invested  Effort  on 
Valuation  
Reward size, probability, delay, and expected effort are the most frequently investigated 
decision variables in neuroscientific research. Relatively few evidence has been provided for 
two  other  variables  influencing  valuation-related  processes,  and  consequently  choice 
behavior, i.e., the proximity to the desired goal and the previously invested effort to attain that 
goal.  
A paradigm only used in monkey thus far to investigate these variables is the multitrial 
reward  schedule  paradigm  (Bowman,  Aigner,  &  Richmond,  1996).  In  this  paradigm,  a 
sequence of identical actions is required to obtain reward, and a visual cue indicates how 
many action steps remain before a reward is delivered. When performing in such multitrial 
reward schedules, the error rate of monkeys is proportional to the number of unrewarded trials 
remaining before reward, indicating that the value of the trial is modified by knowing the   Theoretical Background       
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proximity to the desired goal.  The behavioral  modulation contingent to goal proximity is 
potentially based on accordant adjustments of valuation related brain regions. Shidara and 
Richmond  (2002)  identified  neurons  in  the  monkeys‟  CMA,  the  putative  homologue  of 
human rostral cingulate zone (RCZ; Picard & Strick, 2001) in posteromedial frontal cortex, 
that  reflect  goal-based  valuation by coding the proximity to  a  rewarding outcome. These 
CMA  neurons  showed  progressively  increasing  or  decreasing  response  strengths  while 
monkeys  performed  in  schedules  of  multiple  trials  with  a  visual  cue  indicating  reward 
proximity. Notably, neurons in striatum (Shidara, Aigner, & Richmond, 1998), dopaminergic 
midbrain (Ravel & Richmond, 2006), and orbitofrontal cortex (Simmons & Richmond, 2008) 
are also active as monkeys work their way through schedules of responses to obtain reward. 
CMA, however, is distinguished by the presence of single neurons showing increasing firing 
rates as animals progress through such schedules (Shidara & Richmond, 2002). So far, it is an 
open question which regions in the human brain mediate the influence of increasing reward 
expectation while working through routine actions towards an anticipated reward.   
Furthermore, in monkeys, the value of the current trial in a multitrial reward schedule also 
seems to be modified by the number of trials already completed, i.e., the previously invested 
effort (La Camera & Richmond, 2008). Also in humans, previous effort investment has been 
shown to have a substantial influence on outcome evaluation in the research fields of social 
psychology and economics. For example, a known phenomenon in economic decision making 
is the so-called sunk-cost fallacy, i.e., the increased tendency to persist in an endeavor once an 
investment of money, effort, or time has been made. The effect is  considered potentially 
maladaptive because only current costs and benefits, not past costs, should factor into rational 
decision-making  (Navarro  &  Fantino,  2005).  While  some  doubt  that  there  are  clear-cut 
instances of the sunk cost effect in non-human animals (Arkes & Ayton, 1999), it has been 
documented in numerous studies with humans (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Staw & Hoang, 1995; 
Moon,  2001).  The  sunk  cost  phenomenon  comes  in  different  varieties  and  with  different 
interpretations (to the point of having different names, like „„Concorde effect,‟‟ „„cognitive 
dissonance,‟‟ or „„justification of effort‟‟) (Arkes & Ayton, 1999). Importantly, all of these 
interpretations are based on motivational context effects due to differential effort expenditure, 
i.e., the influence of previously invested effort is conceptualized as an instance of the above 
mentioned  “framing”  (section  2.1.1).  Surprisingly,  evidence  of  the  influence  of  previous 
workload on neuronal systems concerned with goal-based valuation is still missing both in   Theoretical Background       
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humans and in non-human animals, despite the prominent role of this motivational variable in 
other research fields. 
 
2.4  Aims of the present work 
The aim of the present work is to investigate how reward proximity and invested effort 
influence behavioral performance and neuronal systems concerned with goal based valuation 
in  humans.  We  addressed  this  question  in  two  fMRI  studies  by  integrating  a  non-choice 
reward anticipation task (Knutson et al., 2001) into different versions of a multitrial reward 
schedule paradigm (Shidara & Richmond, 2002; Ichihara-Takeda & Funahashi, 2006). 
The first experiment is mainly concerned with the influence of goal proximity along with 
the  previously  invested  effort  on  the  activity  of  the  human  rostral  cingulate  zone  in  the 
posterior medial frontal cortex. The strong anatomical hypothesis was derived from a recent 
monkey study using a similar experimental design (Shidara & Richmond, 2002, section 2.3). 
If the RCZ is indeed underlying the increasing reward anticipation over action steps towards 
predicted outcome, as proposed by the study of Shidara and Richmond (2002), signals in this 
region should be directly related to goal proximity, i.e., they should change contingent to the 
progress through the schedule. In humans, like in monkeys, pMFC seems to be a promising 
site for such a reward-proximity signal, as it is related to the monitoring of performance in 
relation  to  anticipated  rewards  (Ridderinkhof,  Ullsperger,  Crone,  &  Nieuwenhuis,  2004). 
Alterations  of  this  progression  could  be  the  basis  for  the  changes  from  normal  that  are 
reported  in  pMFC  activity  for  obsessive-compulsive  disorder  and  drug  abuse,  conditions 
characterized by dysfunctional persistence in behavior related to deficient outcome valuation 
(Shidara & Richmond, 2002).  
The  second  experiment  was  designed  to  investigate  the  impact  of  invested  effort  on 
neuronal activity and behavior and was more explorative in nature concerning the related 
brain regions. Monkeys are willing to put more effort in a trial if the total effort to get there 
had been larger, even though this does not affect the upcoming reward  (“schedule length 
effect”; La Camera & Richmond, 2008). Also in humans, previous effort investment has been 
shown to have a substantial influence on outcome evaluation in other research fields (e.g., 
Navarro & Fantino, 2005). Correspondingly, we hypothesized that effort expenditure must 
modulate neuronal systems concerned with processes of outcome valuation.    Theoretical Background       
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As in this experiment the number of action steps per schedule varied randomly, the action 
course towards reward was less routine bound compared to the first experiment, thus yielding 
an increase of general performance monitoring demands. First of all, we hypothesized that 
regions  generally  associated  with  cognitive  control  functions  are  involved  in  effort-based 
value representation, analogous to the concept of a patient δ-system being activated when 
rewards  are  not  immediately  attainable  (section  2.2.3).  Furthermore,  a  previous  study  of 
Kouneiher and colleagues (2009) suggested that functional connectivity between lateral and 
medial PFC regions mediates the relationships between cognitive demands and motivational 
incentives, i.e., different reward sizes, to assure appropriate distribution of cognitive control 
resources. We sought to investigate whether or not such a connectivity profile could also be 
found with invested effort as a motivational incentive. As a question related aside, we were 
interested  whether  or  not  activity  in  effort  related  brain  regions  would  be  modulated 
contingent to the amount of previous effort expenditure.  
Second,  the  other  main  focus  of  this  study  was  to  find  out  which  brain  regions  are 
involved in the implementation of the so called “sunk cost effect”, i.e., a framing effect based 
on previous effort expenditure (see section 2.3). It can be argued that, in the reward schedule 
task, the cost of performing trials is a „„sunk‟‟ cost, as the subjects had to start the schedule 
anew  after  each  error  trial.  Accordingly,  there  should  be  brain  regions  concerned  with 
maintaining a state representation given the context of an immediate vs. a delayed block, in 
which the risk of sinking costs is substantially higher. Recent  evidence indicates that the 
posterior LPFC and OFC are involved in representing cognitive and motivational aspects of 
the current environment (section 2.1). Disorganization symptoms observed in schizophrenic 
patients are supposed to be related to impairments in processing such context information in 
LPFC (MacDonald et al., 2006). 
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3  Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures local changes of cerebral blood 
flow. These changes are attributed to changes in neuronal activity and interpreted in terms of 
cognitive  brain  functions.  Below,  a  brief  introduction  into  the  physical  and  physiological 
bases  of  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI)  is  given.  Of  course,  such  an 
introduction can only  give an outline of these  bases.  For a  comprehensive treatment,  the 
reader  might  want  to  consult  the  introduction  to  fMRI  by  Huettel,  Song,  and  McCarthy 
(2004). 
 
3.1  Physical Basis of fMRI 
The  body  is  largely  composed  of  water  molecules  which  each  contain  two  hydrogen 
nuclei or protons. MRI primarily images the signals from these hydrogen nuclei.   
Protons  in  anatomic  nuclei  spin  about  themselves  (therefore  they  are  also  referred  to 
simply as spins). Thus, as any rotating mass, they possess an angular momentum. But as 
protons not only have mass but also charge, protons also possess a magnetic moment. This 
magnetic moment can be described as a vector. When no external magnetic field is applied, 
the vectors are oriented randomly. However, when these spins are placed in a strong external 
magnetic field (e.g., when a human body is moved into an MRI scanner) they align in two 
directions with corresponding energy "eigenstates" along the direction of the magnetic field. 
Always a few more spins align in parallel (their low energy state) than in antiparallel direction 
(their high energy state). The magnetic moments of the surplus parallel protons add up along 
the  magnetic  field.  This  is  the  so-called  longitudinal  magnetization  state  of  the  net 
magnetization vector and it is due to the tiny excess of protons in the lower energy state. But 
only magnetization perpendicular to the external field can be measured with MRI scanners. 
To  bring  the  magnetic  vector  to  point  into  another  direction,  MRI  makes  use  of  another 
property of the protons. In addition to their rotating movement about themselves, they precess 
when placed inside the powerful magnetic field of the scanner. This means their axis of spins 
performs a rotation of itself. Thus, we have in fact two rotations. The proton rotates around its 
axis of spin and at the same time this axis of spin performs a small precession movement   Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging       
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around the vector representing the external magnetic field. The precession frequency depends 
on the strength of the externally applied magnetic field. The higher the strength, the higher the 
precession frequency. This frequency is called the Larmor frequency. 
When a corresponding RF (radio frequency, a so-called 90°) pulse is applied, two things 
happen. First, the protons absorb energy and the proton magnetization vector starts to turn in 
the  direction  of  the  high-energy  state  (i.e.  the  antiparallel  direction).  This  reduces  the 
longitudinal magnetization. Second, the precession of the protons is synchronized; the spins 
now precess in phase with each other. This turns the net polarization vector sideways into a 
transverse magnetization and the spins to precess perpendicular to the external field. 
Once  the  RF  pulse  is  turned  off,  relaxation  happens.  The  longitudinal  magnetization 
recovers as spins return to their low-energy state. The important one for the fMRI, however, is 
the decay of the transverse magnetization as a consequence of the dephasing of spins. The 
corresponding signal  is  oscillating at  resonance  frequency  and is  due to  variations  of the 
transverse magnetization vector and can be described as an exponential curve. 
Of course, when measuring MRI, not only the signal per se, but also the localization of the 
signal is of huge importance. Spatial localization in MRI is accomplished by a controlled 
manipulation  of  the  magnetic  field.  Based  on  the  equivalence  between  strength  of  the 
magnetic field and precession frequency mentioned above a spatially variant magnetic field 
will lead to a spatially variant distribution of resonant frequencies. Accordingly, magnetic 
field  manipulations  are  induced  that  get  the  spins  to  vary  in  their  precession  frequency 
depending  on  their  spatial  location.  With  such  a  gradient  superimposed  on  the  original 
external field, it is possible to select a slice for imaging by applying the proper excitation 
pulse (that means that only in this slice the spins are turned and thus only they can contribute 
to the signal). For localization in 2D, which is simply an MR image, two more gradients must 
be applied in a precise sequence. A method that is commonly used in functional MRI to 
encode the object data in two dimensions is called Echo Planar Imaging (EPI).  
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3.2  Physiological Basis of fMRI 
What kind of physiological signal is measured with fMRI?  
As mentioned above the signal used in fMRI is based on the dephasing of the spins and 
the  subsequent  decay  of  transverse  magnetization.  Crucially,  how  fast  the  spins  dephase 
depends on the magnetic properties of the environment depending on the oxygenation level of 
the surrounding blood. Early research on the MRI signal demonstrated that deoxygenated 
hemoglobin  (hemoglobin  that  does  not  carry  oxygen)  is  paramagnetic  while  oxygenated 
hemoglobin (hemoglobin that carries oxygen) is diamagnetic. The presence of paramagnetic 
oxygen leads to faster spin dephasing causing a more rapid decay of the MR signal. 
And where is the relation to brain function? 
When neurons of a particular brain site become active, energy is required (e.g., for ion 
transportation and neurotransmitter metabolism), which is partly provided by arterial blood 
supply of oxygenated hemoglobin.  The increase in  oxygenation usually  even exceeds  the 
actual demand in the respective brain region. Thus, there is more oxyhemoglobin during an 
active state than during a non-active state, which causes a differential MR signal. This signal 
is  used  for  functional  MRI.  The  dynamic  regulation  of  blood  flow  is  called  HR 
(hemodynamic response) or BOLD (blood-oxygenation-level-dependent) response. 
The BOLD response to neural activity is delayed and relatively slow compared to actual 
brain activity. It consists of a short onset delay, a rise to a peak after about 6 seconds, a return 
to baseline after about 12 seconds, and a prolonged undershoot. Amplitude and latency of the 
HR depend on the strength of the evoking stimulus on the one hand but also on the region 
where it is measured.  
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4  Imaging Study 1 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In this experiment, we set out to investigate goal proximity signals in humans. To this end, 
we measured BOLD signals while participants performed a classical reward anticipation task 
(Knutson et al., 2001) under delayed vs. immediate reward schedules (Ichihara-Takeda & 
Funahashi, 2006). In the delayed condition, participants received a monetary reward only after 
successful completion of four consecutive trials, while they received a smaller reward (1/4) 
for each successful trial in the immediate condition. This allowed us to distinguish brain 
regions sensitive to increasing reward proximity from regions that solely code the progress 
through a schedule, independent of reward.  
In a neurophysiological study with monkeys, the CMA was identified to code for goal 
proximity  (Shidara  &  Richmond,  2002).  Accordingly,  we  expected  that  in  humans  the 
homologous region, i.e., the RCZ in the pMFC (Picard & Strick, 2001), would also exhibit a 
signal sensitive to goal proximity. 
A parallel line of research has associated the pMFC with cost-benefit decision making, 
specifically  with  representing  the  integrated  value  of  an  action  outcome  in  terms  of 
anticipated benefits and effort that one has to invest (e.g., Rudebeck et al., 2006; Croxson et 
al., 2009). We therefore also varied reward magnitude, enabling us to examine the interaction 
of reward magnitude and goal proximity, and to compare the anticipation of identical rewards 
resulting from high as compared to no previously invested effort.  
 
4.2  Materials and Methods 
4.2.1  Participants 
18 participants took part in this experiment (9 male; mean age, 23.1 years). Informed 
consent was obtained according to a protocol approved by the local ethics committee. All 
subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision. None of the subjects had a history of 
neurological, major medical, or psychiatric disorders, and all were right-handed, as assessed    Imaging Study 1       
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by  the  Edinburgh  Inventory  (Oldfield,  1971).  One  subject  was  excluded  due  to  poor 
experimental performance. Subjects took part in two separate fMRI sessions. Subjects were 
informed that they would receive monetary reward related to their performance.  
 
4.2.2  Experimental Procedure 
In the present experiment, we integrated a slightly modified Monetary Incentive Delay 
(MID) Task (Knutson et al., 2001; Fig. 1a) into a multitrial reward schedule paradigm adapted 
from Ichihara-Takeda and Funahashi (2006; Fig. 1b). The MID task is a commonly used 
delayed response task that is frequently used to identify neural systems involved in reward 
anticipation. In our version, each MID trial begins with a cue (250 ms) instructing subjects to 
prepare for a response with either the index or the middle finger. Then subjects fixated on a 
cross-hair for a variable delay interval (2000-2500 ms). As soon as a white target square 
appeared (222 – 341 ms) subjects had to respond as quickly as possible with the appropriate 
button press. Feedback (1500 ms) followed the target and notified participants whether or not 
they  had  reacted  quickly  enough.  Target  durations  were  adjusted  such  that  participants 
succeeded on approximately 80% of responses, based on reaction times obtained during a 
practice session. Subjects were not informed that the practice session conducted in the MRI 
scanner  before  the  main  experiment  would  serve  for  setting  an  individual  response  time 
criterion. All stimuli were presented at the center of the screen.  
Each multitrial reward schedule consisted of four MID Trials. In the delayed contingency 
condition, subjects received a reward only after successful completion of four consecutive 
trials.  In  the  immediate  condition,  subjects  earned  a  reward  after  every  correct  trial.  In 
addition, we manipulated the magnitude of reward. In the low reward condition, subjects 
could earn 5 euro-cents per correct trial in the immediate condition and 20 euro-cents for four 
correct trials in the delayed condition. In the high reward condition, subjects earned 20 euro-
cents per correct trial in the immediate condition and 80 euro-cents for four correct trials in 
the delayed condition. This resulted in a 2 x 2 x 4 factorial design in which one factor is 
contingency (2 levels: delayed and immediate), the other reward magnitude (2 levels: low and 
high reward), and the third one is position in schedule (4 levels). Contingency and reward 
magnitude of the upcoming schedule were indexed by both an instruction screen (2 s) at the 
beginning    (“delayed  high”/  “delayed  low”/  “immediate  high”/  “immediate  low”)  and  a    Imaging Study 1       
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corresponding, colored rectangular frame that was on the screen throughout the sequence of 
four trials. The mapping of colors to conditions was balanced across participants. In addition, 
feedback  was  given  after  every  single  trial  and  this  feedback  additionally  informed 
concerning the experimental condition and the current position within a schedule (e.g., 20/20 
at any position in the immediate-high-reward condition or 20/80 at the 1
st position in the 
delayed-high-reward condition). The succession of the different contingency schedules was 
randomized.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. a, Sequence of stimulus events of the modified Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task (Knutson et al, 
2001). b, Multitrial reward schedules. Every schedule consisted of 4 MID trials. In the delayed contingency 
condition  subjects  received  a  reward  only  after  the  successful  completion  of  4  consecutive  trials.  In  the 
immediate contingency condition subjects received a smaller monetary reward after every trial. In addition, we 
manipulated the magnitude of reward. Feedback was given after every single trial. This feedback additionally 
informed subjects concerning the experimental condition and the current position within a schedule. 
 
Whenever  participants  made  an  error  in  any  of  the  trials  in  the  delayed  contingency 
conditions,  the  schedule  was  aborted  and  no  reward  was  given.  Responding  late,  not    Imaging Study 1       
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responding at all, and a wrong button press constituted an error. In the immediate condition, 
the trial sequence continued in case of an error. However, only completely correct schedules 
were  included  in  the  analyses.  The  main  experiment  consisted  of  28  schedules  for  each 
contingency x reward magnitude combination (delayed low, delayed high, immediate low, 
immediate high), resulting in a total of 112 multitrial reward schedules. As each schedule 
consists of four MID trials there were also 28 trials of each trial type defined by contingency, 
reward magnitude, and position. Given that delayed multitrial schedules were aborted after 
incorrect responses, the actual number of trials within delayed schedules presented to the 
subjects varied dependent on the individual error rates (i.e., between 11 and 25). The mean 
number  of  trials  within  schedules  that  were  included  in  the  fMRI  analyses  varied  across 
conditions (i.e., between 15.72 and 21.44) and is reported in the Results section. 
The trial-to-trial interval (i.e., between trials, within schedule) varied between 3 and 7 s 
and was balanced across conditions. One block of four MID trials lasted between 38 and 42 s. 
After each schedule, a cross-hair was displayed for 14 s before the next schedule began. The 
experiment was acquired in two scanning sessions, each of which lasted about 60 minutes. 
Subjects were trained, without reward, for 15 minutes prior to scanning.  
 
4.2.3  fMRI Procedure 
Subjects were positioned head first and supine in the magnet bore. Images were collected 
with a 3T Trio MRI scanner system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany). Prior to 
the functional runs of each session, a T1-weighted anatomical scan with the same spatial 
orientation and slice prescription as the functional data was acquired. Whole brain functional 
images  were  collected  using  a  T2*-weighted  echo-planar  imaging  sequence,  sensitive  to 
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, image matrix = 
64 x 64, FOV = 192 mm, flip angle = 80°, slice thickness = 3 mm, 1 mm interslice gap, in-
plane resolution 3 mm x 3 mm, 32 oblique axial slices). A varying number of images were 
acquired per run due to varying numbers of abortions of the delayed contingency schedules. A 
T1-weighted, three-dimensional high-resolution magnetization-prepared (MP)-Rage scan was 
obtained after the functional scans.  
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4.2.4  fMRI Analysis 
The  fMRI  data  were  analyzed  with  statistical  parametric  mapping,  using  the  SPM5 
software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The first ten seconds 
of functional images were excluded from the analysis to minimize T1 relaxation artifacts. 
Separately for each session, a slice time correction was applied to correct for the temporal 
offset between the slices acquired in one scan. Then images were realigned using the first 
image of the first scan session as a reference and a mean image for all scan volumes was 
created. Thus, the realignment (which is based on a 2
nd degree B-Spline coregistration of each 
image  to  the  reference  image)  effectively  coregistered  functional  images  from  the  two 
sessions. The high-resolution structural image was coregistered with the mean image of the 
EPI series and normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute template. The normalization 
parameters  were  then  applied  to  the  EPI  images  to  ensure  an  anatomically  informed 
normalization. Voxels were resampled into a size of 2 x 2 x 2 mm and a spatial filter of 8 mm 
FWHM (full-width at half maximum) was applied. The time series data at each voxel were 
processed using a high-pass filter with a cut-off of 256 s to remove low-frequency drifts. 
Subject-level  statistical  analyses  were  performed  using  the  general  linear  model.  The 
design  matrix  for  event-related  analysis  was  created  using  the  canonical  hemodynamic 
response function (HRF) as provided by SPM5, including the first derivative to account for 
variable delays. The main events of interest for the event-related analysis were the reward 
anticipation phases of each condition. We thus calculated a general linear model (GLM) for 
each subject that included separate predictors for the anticipation phase of each trial type. 
Thus, there were 16 different trial types that constituted the covariates of interest (defined by 
the combination of the two contingency levels, the two reward magnitude levels, and the four 
position levels). 
To  ascertain  statistical  independence  of  the  results  for  the  anticipation  phase  from 
activations related to the outcome phase of the task (that was not of interest in the present 
analysis), we modeled the outcome phases from correctly answered trials of all 16 trial types 
as a single predictor (which resulted in cross-correlation coefficients between anticipation and 
outcome phases ranging between 0.0684 and 0.2902). As covariates of no interest we further 
included the outcome phases from all incorrectly answered trial types, anticipation phases 
from  incorrectly  answered  trials  separately  for  immediate  and  delayed  contingency, 
anticipation  phases  from  incomplete  schedules  separately  for  immediate  and  delayed    Imaging Study 1       
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contingency (i.e., trials from immediate contingency schedules in which at least one error 
occurred and trials from delayed contingency schedules that were later aborted due to an 
error), as well as one single predictor for outcome phases from incomplete schedules, and 
motion parameters derived from spatial realignment.  
Subject-specific  contrast  images  were  constructed  by  linear  combinations  of  the  beta 
parameters resulting from the general linear model, and then entered into a random-effects 
model testing group effects by means of a one-sample t-test.  
As the CMA in monkeys is the only region reported thus far containing single neurons 
that  are  progressively  changing  their  activation  strength  contingent  to  increasing  reward 
proximity,  we  confined  our  primary  analyses  of  interest  to  the  RCZ,  the  putative  human 
homologue of monkeys' CMA (Picard & Strick, 2001). To capture the boundaries of the RCZ 
as precisely as possible, we generated an anatomical mask of the RCZ by performing an 
anatomical conjunction between (a) a standard mask comprising the cingulate gyrus and the 
anterior cingulate (as defined by the Talairach Daemon Labels Masks, Lancaster, Summerln 
Rainey, Freitas, & Fox, 1997; Lancaster et al., 2000; using the WFU Pick Atlas, Maldijan, 
Laurienti, Kraft, &  Burdette, 2003) and (b) a self-generated  anatomical box covering the 
previously published extension of RCZ in all three directions (i.e., from -20 to 20 in the x-
direction, from 50 to -20 in the y-direction, and from 10 to 55 in the z-direction; Ridderinkhof 
et  al.,  2003,  Fig.  1).  The  resulting  anatomically  derived  mask  is  displayed  in  Figures 
presenting the results of respective ROI analyses (Figs. 3a, 5a, 6a).  
To protect against false positive activations, we used a double-threshold approach that 
involves  combining a voxel-based threshold with  a minimum  cluster size (Forman  et  al., 
1995). This nonarbitrary cluster size was determined on the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation 
(1,000 iterations) determined with AFNI's AlphaSim tool (Ward, 2000; http://afni.nimh.nih. 
gov/afni). We determined the minimal cluster size for an individual voxel height threshold of 
T > 3.65 (p < 0.001, uncorrected) to ensure an overall image-wise false positive rate of 5%. 
This resulted in a cluster size threshold of 17 voxels for the anatomical mask of the RCZ. An 
additional Monte Carlo simulation (1,000 iterations) was conducted to determine cluster size 
thresholds for whole brain analyses. This  yielded a cluster size of 91 voxels. Activations 
exceeding this threshold are considered to be activated at an experiment-wise threshold of p < 
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The specific pattern of goal proximity signals (as defined by a contingency x position 
interaction) was examined by extracting mean parameter estimates from the beta images that 
were  calculated  during  model  estimation  of  the  original  general  linear  model,  and  by 
subjecting these to further analyses using standard statistics software. ROIs for these analyses 
were defined as peak voxels in three foci in the RCZ defined by previous analyses.  
Furthermore, we assessed whether or not functional connectivities between brain regions 
were  modulated  by  reward  proximity.  To  this  end,  we  conducted  psychophysiological 
interaction  analyses  (PPI;  Friston  et  al.,  1997)  with  the  posterior  portion  of  the  RCZ  as 
individually determined seed region (cf. Results section). 14 participants were included in this 
analysis, as the remaining four subjects did not show significant univariate activation in or in 
the direct vicinity of the area of interest in the contrast delayed-4th position versus delayed-
1st position (at thresholds as low as p < 0.01). For the PPI analysis, a novel GLM was set up 
that encompassed three regressors, i.e., the time series of individually determined peak voxels 
from the seed region as a physiological predictor (individual peak voxels ranging from 2 to 12 
in the x-direction, from 0 to 12 in the y-direction, and from 42 to 50 in the z-direction; mean 
coordinates x = 7; y = 6; z = 43), the contingency (delayed vs. immediate) x position relative 
to the goal (i.e., close (4
th + 3
rd) vs. distant (2
nd + 1
st)) interaction as psychological predictor, 
as well as the interaction of these two variables which served as the psychophysiological 
interaction  term.  The  PPI  analysis  was  thresholded  at  the  whole  brain  level  as  described 
above. 
 
4.3  Results 
4.3.1  Behavioral Data 
Subjects made relatively fewer errors under delayed contingency and under high reward 
magnitude (main effect of contingency: F(1,17) = 13.1, p = 0.002; main effect of reward 
magnitude: F(1,17) = 26.84, p < 0.001; cf. Fig. 2), but the two factors did not interact (p = 
0.467).  In  addition,  the  percentage  of  errors  did  not  vary  over  the  different  positions.  In 
general,  the  performance  in  the  experiment  was  slightly  better  compared  to  the  practice 
session, which explains the error rates being below the intended 20 %. Delayed contingency 
and high reward expectation also reduced reaction times (delayed low 228 ms [SE 0.004]; 
delayed high 225 ms [SE 0.004]; immediate low 229 ms [SE 0.004]; immediate high 228 ms    Imaging Study 1       
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[SE 0.004]; main effect of contingency: F(1,17) = 4.13, p = 0.058; main effect of reward 
magnitude : F(1,17) = 10.1, p = 0.006). Again the two factors did not interact (p = 0.149) and 
we did not find any significant effect over the positions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Behavioral performance is enhanced under delayed contingency and under high reward. 
 
On average, participants performed without any error in 17.83 schedules (63.68% [SE 
3.5]) in the delayed-low, in 21.44 schedules (76.57% [SE 2]) in the delayed-high, in 15.72 
(56.14% [SE 3.4]) schedules in the immediate low, and in 18.28 schedules in the immediate 
high condition (65,29% [SE 3.7]; main effect of contingency: F(1,17) = 26.7, p < 0.001; main 
effect of reward magnitude: F(1,17) = 22.2, p < 0.001; interaction between contingency and 
reward  magnitude:  F(1,17)  =  0.74,  p  =  0.391).  Thus,  performance  was  enhanced  under 
delayed contingency and under high reward.  
As single trial types (e.g., delay low, 3
rd position) were only included in the analyses when 
the complete corresponding schedule (e.g., delayed low schedule) was performed without any 
error, the number of completely correct schedules corresponds to trial numbers (in the sense 
of numbers of trials per contingency, reward, and position) included in the analysis of reaction 
times and fMRI data.  
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4.3.2  fMRI Data 
Neural Correlates of Goal Proximity: Contingency x Position Interaction 
Our primary interest was the analysis of the interaction between contingency (delayed 
versus immediate) and position in schedule (4
th position versus 1
st position), collapsed across 
reward  magnitudes,  which  should  identify  brain  regions  sensitive  to  increasing  reward 
proximity during a sequence of actions. This analysis yielded activation foci in a posterior 
part of the RCZ (pRCZ; Fig. 3a; Table 1). The reverse contrast did not yield any significant 
activation. This result is consistent with previous reports of CMA activity in monkeys being 
related to the degree of reward expectancy (Shidara & Richmond, 2002). No other frontal 
region outside of the RCZ showed contingency x position interactions, when assessed in an 
explorative whole-brain analysis (but see Table 1 for areas outside of frontal cortex). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Group functional activation maps, overlaid on the average of the normalized structural images of the 
study participants. RCZ mask is visualized in transparent red, activations within the mask are thresholded at p < 
0.001, k > 17 (cf. Methods and Materials). Parameter estimates are averaged across reward magnitude. a, Goal 
proximity effect in the posterior RCZ (pRCZ) identified using the contingency x position interaction contrast. b, 
Parameter estimates for pRCZ for each position and contingency condition. del, delayed; imm, immediate.   
 
We next aimed at examining whether or not the pRCZ would indeed exhibit a stepwise 
increase or decrease of brain activity related to actual reward proximity as suggested by the 
non-human primate literature (while the interaction effects reported above could also result 
from different patterns of activation). To this end, we extracted mean parameter estimates for 
each subject, separately for each position and contingency condition, collapsed across reward 
magnitude.  While  this  kind  of  analysis  (i.e.,  testing  the  interaction  in  a  cluster  that  was    Imaging Study 1       
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
34 
 
identified in the whole brain analysis as showing an interaction) is potentially subject to non-
independence  error  (Kriegeskorte,  Simmons,  Bellgowan,  &  Baker,  2009),  we  used  it 
exclusively to resolve the whole-brain interaction effect, with the aim of better understanding 
the nature of the obtained interaction effect.  
As expected, the ROI analysis replicated the significant modulation of position effects by 
contingency of the schedule (interaction effect position x contingency, F(1,17) = 8.19, p < 
0.001).  The  pRCZ  exhibited  a  steeper  position-related  increase  of  activity  in  the  delayed 
contingency in comparison to the immediate contingency condition (Fig. 3b), which reflects 
the coding of the proximity to actual reward attainment in the delayed contingency condition. 
We also found significant main effects of position (F(1,17) = 31.01, p < .001), contingency 
(F(1,17)  =  8.10,  p  <  0.011),  and  reward  magnitude  (F(1,17)  =  10.94,  p  =  0.004).  The 
remaining interaction effects were not significant (interaction effect contingency x reward 
F(1,17) = 3.40, p = 0.081; interaction effect position x reward F(1,17) = 0.33, p = 0.803; 
interaction effect contingency x position x reward F(1,17) = 0.56, p = 0.644).  
 
Table 1. Proximity Effect: Activation for the interaction contrast contingency x position. 
  Peak voxel (in mm)   
Brain region  cluster size  x  y  z  voxel T 
¹Posterior  Rostral  Cingulate  Zone 
(pRCZ) 
59  12  4  46   4.92 
²Middle Temporal Gyrus  134  48  -24  -6   6.03 
²Inferior Parietal Cortex  132  40  -32  24   5.84 
¹ ROI analysis restricted to RCZ mask. 
² Explorative whole brain analysis. 
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Functional Connectivity of the Rostral Cingulate Zone 
If the pRCZ truly has a crucial role in governing goal-directed behavior during a series of 
action steps towards a predicted outcome, we furthermore hypothesized that the pRCZ should 
be more strongly  coupled with  regions  related  to  motor functions  when the individual is 
getting closer to the goal, i.e., during the last trials as compared to the first trials of a multitrial 
schedule. Importantly, this goal proximity effect on functional pRCZ connectivity should be 
more prominent under delayed than under immediate contingency. To explore the functional 
connectivity pattern of the pRCZ, we applied psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI; 
Friston  et  al.,  1997)  to  the  interaction  between  contingency  (delayed  vs.  immediate)  and 
position. The physiological predictor was the time series from the peak voxel of the seed 
region,  i.e.,  pRCZ.  It  was  modulated  by  the  interaction  of  contingency  and  position 
(psychological predictor), thus testing a 3-way psycho-physiological interaction. Significant 
PPI effects were observed in the premotor cortex, putamen, thalamus, and cerebellum (Fig. 4; 
Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Goal proximity effect on functional pRCZ connectivity. While working towards a delayed reward, 
pRCZ (see Fig. 3a) exhibited an increased coupling with dorsal premotor cortex (a, dPM) and putamen (b). 
Images are thresholded at p < 0.001, k > 91.  
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Table 2. Areas showing a reward proximity effect (i.e., contingency x position interaction ) in the psycho-
physiological interaction analysis with pRCZ seed. 
  Peak voxel (in mm)   
Brain region  cluster size  x  y  z  voxel T 
Dorsal Premotor Cortex (dPM)  349  -38  -20  58     8.53 
Basal ganglia (putamen)  262  -22  2  -2     6.16 
Thalamus  291  -6  -12  2     6.17 
Cerebellum   135  24  -46  -28     5.95 
 
 
Effects of Reward Magnitude 
In numerous studies RCZ was additionally found to code choice outcomes in terms of 
expected costs and reward magnitude (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Kennerley et al., 2009a; 
Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b). In the current study, we were also able to assess these variables. 
In the delayed contingency condition, monetary reward was only administered after the 4
th 
position. Given that the size of the actually administered reward, after the 4
th trial, differed 
between  the  delayed  and  the  immediate  conditions,  we  compared  the  effect  of  reward 
magnitude separately for the delayed and immediate contingency condition.  
The contrast of differential reward magnitude after equal effort expenditure in the delayed 
contingency condition (i.e., delayed-high-4
th position > delayed-low-4
th position) identified a 
region  in  the  anterior  RCZ  (aRCZ;  Fig.  5a;  Table  3).  Whole-brain  analyses  additionally 
showed a reward magnitude effect (delayed contingency) in dopaminergic midbrain. No area 
showed significantly greater activation for high as compared to low reward under immediate 
contingency.   
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Figure 5. Group functional activation maps, overlaid on the average of the normalized structural images of the 
study participants. RCZ mask is visualized in transparent red, activations within the mask are thresholded at p < 
0.001,  k  >  17  (cf.  Methods  and  Materials).  Parameter  estimates  are  averaged  across  reward  magnitude.  a, 
Activations in the anterior RCZ (aRCZ) and posterior cingulate cortex (pCC) for the contrast of differential 
reward  magnitude  after  equal  effort  expenditure.  b,  Parameter  estimates  for  aRCZ  for  each  position  and 
contingency condition revealing that aRCZ shows a significant contingency x position interaction. del, delayed; 
imm, immediate.   
 
Examination of parameter estimates in the aRCZ revealed a proximity effect comparable 
to  pRCZ,  i.e.,  significantly  steeper  activation  increase  during  delayed  as  compared  to 
immediate reward contingency (interaction effect contingency x position, F(1,17) = 5.04, p = 
0.04; Fig 5c). The region further displayed significant main effects of contingency (F(1,17) = 
15.49, p = 0.001) and position (F(1,17) = 19.86, p < 0.001), and a significant interaction effect 
of reward and contingency (F(1,17) = 11.43, p = 0.004). Importantly, reward magnitude per 
se did not modulate aRCZ activity (main effect reward magnitude (F(1,17) = 2.03, p = 0.172), 
thus indicating that this aRCZ subregion integrates information about reward magnitude and 
contingency. 
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Table 3. Reward Magnitude Effect: Activation for delayed high 4
th position versus delayed low 4
th position. 
  Peak voxel (in mm)   
Brain region  cluster size  x  y  z  voxel T 
¹Anterior Rostral Cingulate Zone 
(aRCZ) 
74  6  30  18  4.74 
¹Posterior Cingulate Cortex (pCC)  154  6  -6  46  4.94 
²Posterior Cingulate Cortex (pCC)  152  14  -24  42  4.83 
²Superior Temporal Gyrus  117  -48  8  4  4.90 
²Superior Parietal Cortex  331  -20  -56  66  6.19 
²Occipital Cortex  107  4  -82  18  5.49 
²Substantia Nigra  189  8  -18  -10  5.49 
²Cerebellum  1311  20  -50  -20  6.35 
²Posterior Insula  173  -36  -10  -2  5.6 
²Anterior Insula  533  30  8  -18  5.20 
¹ ROI analysis restricted to RCZ mask.  
² Explorative whole brain analysis. 
 
Differential Effort for Equal Reward Magnitude 
By defining the costs of an action as effort already invested, we additionally examined 
how brain activations were modulated by previously invested effort given the expectation of 
constant reward magnitude (i.e., delayed-low-4
th position > immediate-high-4
th position). In 
both of these conditions, subjects expected a reward of 20 euro-cents. The only difference 
between these two conditions lies in the effort participants had invested to gain the predicted    Imaging Study 1       
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reward, prior to the current trial. More specifically, under delayed contingency, participants 
had successfully completed the three preceding trials of the multi-trial schedule, while the 
three  preceding  trials  were  of  no  relevance  for  the  current  outcome  in  the  immediate 
condition. Accordingly, an additional cost variable inherent to this comparison was the risk of 
potential  loss  of  previously  invested  effort  in  case  of  an  error.  The  analysis  yielded  a 
significant effect of previously invested effort in the anterior portion of the RCZ (Fig. 6a; x=-
14, y=34, z=22; T = 5.20; k = 71). No brain regions outside cingulate cortex showed an effort 
related modulation. 
An ROI analysis of the aRCZ yielded a modulation of position effects by contingency of 
the schedule (interaction effect position x contingency, F(1,17) = 4.44, p = 0.008; Fig. 6c). 
Further  significant  effects  were  found  for  contingency  (F(1,17)  =  8.75,  p  =  0.009)  and 
position (F(1,17) = 22.68, p < 0.001; all effects concerning reward magnitude F > 2.07; p > 
0.167).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Group functional activation maps, overlaid on the average of the normalized structural images of the 
study participants. RCZ mask is visualized in transparent red, activations within the mask are thresholded at p < 
0.001, k > 17 (cf. Methods and Materials). Parameter estimates are averaged across reward magnitude. a, The 
contrast of differential effort for equal reward magnitude yielded another activation focus in the aRCZ. b, This 
region also shows a significant contingency x position interaction. del, delayed; imm, immediate.   
 
4.4  Discussion 
The present study shows that the medial prefrontal area RCZ codes the proximity to an 
expected  reward.  Functional  connectivity  analyses  demonstrate  that  the  reward  proximity    Imaging Study 1       
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signal  in  RCZ  covaries  with  activity  in  motor-related  regions.  Thus,  RCZ  seems  to  be 
involved in governing behavior directed towards a delayed reward over several action steps. 
Furthermore, two separable anterior RCZ regions represent the anticipated reward magnitude 
and the effort that was previously invested to reach a given reward. Of note, they also show a 
proximity modulated activity pattern over action steps toward the predicted outcome. In the 
following, we will discuss the contribution of the RCZ to the performance of action sequences 
directed  towards  attaining  a  delayed  goal  together  with  the  region‟s  potential  role  of  a 
continuous updating of action values over a course of actions. 
 
4.4.1  The Role of the Rostral Cingulate Zone for the Integration of Reward 
Information over Several Actions 
Several monkey neurophysiology studies revealed that the CMA is implicated in behavior 
directed toward distant rewards (Procyk & Joseph, 2001; Shidara & Richmond, 2002; Amiez, 
Joseph, & Procyk, 2005; Hoshi, Sawamura, & Tanji, 2005). Previous human neuroimaging 
research has also demonstrated that RCZ integrates information across multiple actions, e.g., 
the number of preceding negative feedback trials (Jocham et al., 2009a; Jocham, Neumann, 
Klein,  Danielmeier,  &  Ullsperger,  2009b).  Most  direct  evidence  comes  from  the 
demonstration that after an ACC lesion, only the outcome of the most recent trial exerts any 
influence over subsequent decisions (Kennerley et al., 2006). Our results are in line with these 
findings, as the multitrial sequences of the present experiment require that the participants 
encode successive elements  of sequential  behavior and integrate information  over several 
action steps. The general activation increase of RCZ across positions, that is visible in our 
data independent of contingency, confirms its role in this regard. It is also in line with reports 
about the general mediation of serial order behavior in this region (Procyk, Tanaka, & Joseph, 
2000), as well as throughout the frontal cortex (Berdyyeva & Olson, 2010). The additional 
modulation  of  the  position  related  increase  in  neuronal  activity  by  reward  contingency, 
however, is the critical result of our study and provides the ultimate evidence that the RCZ 
has the additional crucial role of mediating behavior directed towards delayed goals also in 
humans.  
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4.4.2  Goal Proximity versus Representation of the Subjective Goal Value 
More generally, the pMFC was suggested to represent an integrated signal necessary for 
determining the overall value of actions or decision outcomes (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). 
Importantly, the representation of single decision components that alter the value of a trial 
seems  to  be  more  typical  for  pMFC  than  for  other  prefrontal  brain  regions  such  as 
orbitofrontal  or  lateral  prefrontal  cortex  (Kennerley  et  al.,  2009a).  For  instance,  pMFC 
activity was found to code for decision costs in terms of the amount of work that is necessary 
to earn an expected payoff, but also for the perceived likelihood and the magnitude of a 
successful  outcome  (Croxson  et  al.,  2009;  Kennerley  &  Wallis,  2009b;  Knutson,  Taylor, 
Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005). In the present study, we support this model of multiple 
value representations in pMFC, and show that distinct RCZ subregions are modulated by the 
costs that result from already invested effort, and by reward magnitude, respectively. Of note, 
aRCZ subregions modulated by previous effort and magnitude also showed a goal proximity 
related activation profile. In sum, our data indicate that in humans as in non-human primates, 
the RCZ is  critical  for accumulating distinct aspects  of reward information over multiple 
action steps.  
As of now, it is still an open question which specific type of information is accumulated 
by the pMFC contingent to reward proximity. In monkey neurophysiology, goal proximity 
modulations of neural activity (Bowman et al., 1996; Shidara & Richmond, 2002; Ichihara-
Takeda & Funahashi, 2006) are interpreted as directly reflecting of the amount of work that is 
needed  until  reception  of  reward.  Our  results,  particularly  for  the  posterior  RCZ,  are 
consistent with this interpretation.  
However, in the present experiment, the likelihood of actual goal attainment – combined 
with the risk of the potential loss of already invested effort – changed with each action step. 
As outlined above, pMFC codes probability estimates and reward sizes of expected outcomes 
(e.g.,  Kennerley  et  al.,  2009a).  These  representations  are  thought  to  contribute  to  a 
computation of expected value (EV), i.e., an integration of reward magnitude and probability 
of an anticipated reward. The goal proximity contingent activation profile of RCZ subregions, 
rather  than  reflecting  a  representation  of  proximity  as  such,  could  therefore  reflect  a 
continuous updating of the net value of the upcoming action outcome. In line with this, EV-
computing regions in the pMFC show increasing activity during the anticipation of large-
magnitude, high-probability gains (Knutson et al., 2005). Further evidence that pMFC could    Imaging Study 1       
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track action values during sequential actions comes from reports of a gradual increase of 
activation in this region that coincides with effort expenditure (Croxson et al., 2009). 
Within this conceptual framework, reward proximity signals could also be interpreted as 
an additional factor modulating expected reward value. A more radical interpretation of the 
present data, which would be fully compatible with the assumption of ACC as an integrator of 
multiple  cost  and  benefit  components  of  decisions  (Rushworth  &  Behrens,  2008),  would 
suggest that goal proximity as such is not represented in the brain, but a result of cost benefit 
computations involving expected as well as already invested effort, both of which modulate 
the value of a distant reward. Future work will be needed to explore the relationship between 
goal proximity signals and cost-benefit calculations in pMFC.  
In  contrast  to  a  devaluation  when  anticipating  costs,  as  often  shown  in  discounting 
paradigms (e.g., Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Croxson et al., 2009), already invested effort seems 
to enhance the subjective value of the expected outcome. This bears obvious analogies to 
cognitive  dissonance  theory  in  psychology  (Festinger,  1957),  according  to  which  humans 
attempt to justify additional effort for an equal reward by assigning greater value to outcomes 
following greater effort (Aronson & Mills, 1959).  
We conclude that the RCZ represents the expected value (reward magnitude x probability 
of loss of invested effort) of a reward integrated with proximity to the anticipated action goal. 
Given  the  specific  activation  pattern  observed,  we  speculate  that  anterior  and  posterior 
portions of RCZ both contribute to this function, however possibly with a relative emphasis 
on  reward  proximity  (pRCZ)  versus  reward  magnitude  and  effort  representation  (aRCZ), 
respectively. Based on our functional connectivity results, we can in addition conclude that 
RCZ  modulates  behavior,  contingent  to  reward  proximity,  by  relaying  reward-related 
information onto regions involved in action generation.  
 
4.4.3  A Network for Assuring Goal Achievement 
We assume that the sequentially modulated response pattern of RCZ areas identified here 
is functionally relevant for assuring persistence in goal pursuit when working through series 
of  routine  actions  towards  distant  goals  (Pears,  Parkinson,  Hopewell,  Everitt,  &  Roberts, 
2003). The pMFC is anatomically and functionally ideally suited to fulfill this general role in    Imaging Study 1       
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goal achievement (Shima & Tanji, 1998; Ito, Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003; Matsumoto, 
Suzuki, & Tanaka, 2003; Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Abe, & Tanaka, 2007; Gehring & Taylor, 
2004), as it has extensive connections with brain areas involved in the control of cognitive 
and motor processes and with areas that process reward information (Van Hoesen, Morecraft, 
&  Vogt,  1993;  Paus,  2001;  Morecraft  et  al.,  2007).    More  specifically,  the  extensive 
connections of the cingulate motor areas include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Bates & 
Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Lu, Preston, Strick, 1994) and the brainstem monoamine nuclei (Paus, 
2001), as well as lateral premotor cortex (Barbas & Pandya, 1987; Luppino, Govoni, Matelli, 
1998;  Beckmann,  Johansen-Berg,  &  Rushworth,  2009)  and  the  anterior  striatum  (incl. 
putamen;  Takada  et  al.,  2001;  Haber,  Kim,  Mailly,  &  Calzavara,  2006).  Our  analysis  of 
functional  connectivities  has  shown  that  the  coupling  with  the  latter  two  regions  was 
increased (a) under delayed contingency and (b) when getting closer to the goal. 
The  striatum  is  an  important  part  of  the  circuitry  mediating  influences  of  reward 
expectation on performance. It was suggested that the ventral striatum supports keeping track 
of the progress through learned behavioral sequences (Bowman & Brown, 1998; Shidara et 
al., 1998). While our connectivity analysis yielded a coupling between pRCZ and putamen, 
not ventral striatum, we speculate that the reward proximity modulation of RCZ-putamen 
coupling likely mediates the motor control of reward seeking behavior, as previous work 
showed that the neuronal response in the putamen to financial reward is additionally enhanced 
when a movement is required (Elliott, Newman, Longe, & Deakin, 2004). The functional 
connectivity  of  RCZ  with  premotor  cortex  putatively  reflects  the  increasing  degree  of 
motivation  contingent  to  actual  reward  delivery  (Roesch  &  Olson,  2004),  which  further 
renders  this  circuit  optimally  suitable  for  action  readiness  through  facilitating  action 
preparation.    Imaging Study 2       
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5  Imaging Study 2 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The first imaging study provided evidence that the decision variable of increasing reward 
proximity  might  gradually  enhance  the  valuation  of  expected  outcomes.  Furthermore,  the 
study indicated that the widely acknowledged role of RCZ in action valuation (Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2008) also encompasses the representation of already invested effort intrinsic to the 
actions.  The  second  imaging  study  was  designed  to  investigate  neuronal  and  behavioral 
effects of previously invested effort in more detail. This was motivated by the fact that, to our 
knowledge, the effect of previously invested effort on the valuation of future outcomes has 
not been investigated systematically in the field of cognitive neuroscience thus far. However, 
previous effort investment has been shown to influence error rates in monkeys performing in 
multitrial reward schedules (La Camera & Richmond, 2008). Also in other research fields, 
previous  workload  is  investigated  with  respect  to  the  upvaluation  of  expected  outcomes 
(Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Navarro & Fantino, 2005). 
To  investigate  the  neuronal  signals  related  to  previous  effort  expenditure,  we  again 
measured BOLD activity while participants performed an MID task (for a detailed description 
see section 4.2.2) under delayed vs. immediate contingency. Critically, in this experiment we 
varied the number of action steps (i.e., the workload) that participants had to perform in order 
to  obtain reward.  In the delayed  condition,  participants  received a monetary reward after 
successful completion of one, two, or three consecutive trials, while they received a reward of 
equal magnitude for each successful trial in the immediate condition.  
Due to these variable schedule lengths, the action course towards the reward was less-
routine bound in comparison to the first study, which resulted in a higher cognitive control 
demand.  It  has  been  argued  in  numerous  studies  investigating  the  interaction  between 
cognitive  control  and  reward  size  that  higher  levels  of  motivation  might  act  to  increase 
cognitive  control  in  order  to  sustain  attention  and  prevent  interference,  thus  maximizing 
reward  (Small  et  al.,  2005;  Adcock,  Thangavel,  Whitfield-Gabrieli,  Knutson,  &  Gabrieli, 
2006;  Krawczyk,  Gazzaley,  &  D'Esposito,  2007;  Locke  &  Braver,  2008).  As  effort 
investment obviously also results in an increase in subjective value (Arkes & Ayton, 1999),    Imaging Study 2       
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we  hypothesized  cognitive  control  regions  to  be  modulated  through  previous  effort 
investment when engaging in a series of non-routine actions towards reward. Furthermore, 
such an involvement could also be seen in analogy to a patient δ-decision making system 
comprising higher cognitive control regions that mediates the choices in favor of rewards that 
are more valuable, but not immediately attainable (McClure et al., 2004, 2007).  
Another interesting question in this respect is whether or not previously invested effort 
can modulate functional coupling between pMFC and LPFC. In our first study, we showed 
that RCZ represents the expected value of a reward integrated with the previously invested 
effort to obtain that reward. In an elegant study, Kouneiher and colleagues (2009) could show 
that the RCZ regulates the allocation of cognitive control resources by mid-LPFC according 
to potential rewards and penalties at stake. Given the assumption that, in the present study, the 
variability of schedule lengths leads to an increase in overall cognitive control demands, we 
hypothesized that an enhanced connectivity between RCZ and mid-LPFC can also be found 
depending on previously invested effort acting as a motivational incentive. Furthermore, the 
variable schedule lengths allowed us to investigate whether or not brain regions exist that 
change their activity contingent to the previous workload.  
Another difference to the first experiment is the block-wise presentation of delayed versus 
immediate contingency schedules. This is due to the fact that several researchers have shown 
that people value choice alternatives in relative terms, for example with respect to the price 
range  of  available  options  serving  as  a  contextual  frame  for  relative  outcome  evaluation 
(Padoa-Schioppa,  2009).  Importantly,  this  relative  value  coding  seems  only  to  be 
determinable  between,  and  not  within,  blocks  (Tremblay  &  Schultz,  1999;  Seymour  & 
McClure, 2008). In delayed blocks, the risk of sinking cost, i.e., the contextual frame based on 
higher  effort  expenditure  that  should  set  the  reference  point  for  outcome  evaluation,  is 
substantially higher than in immediate blocks. Accordingly,  the blockwise presentation of 
schedules that consisted of only one action allowed us to investigate which brain regions are 
concerned with maintaining this context representation in absence of other valuation-related 
processes. Recent evidence indicates that the posterior LPFC (Watanabe & Sakagami, 2007) 
and  the  OFC  (Padoa-Schioppa,  2009)  are  involved  in  coding  the  value  dependent  of  the 
cognitive  and  motivational  context  of  the  current  environment.  However,  it  is  an  open 
question whether or not they are also underlying the representation of the contextual frame 
itself that is based on previous workload.    Imaging Study 2       
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5.2  Material and Methods 
5.2.1  Participants 
18 participants took part in this experiment (7 male; mean age, 20.2 years). Informed 
consent was obtained according to a protocol approved by the local ethics committee. All 
subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision. None of the subjects had a history of 
neurological, major medical, or psychiatric disorders, and all were right-handed, as assessed 
by  the  Edinburgh  Inventory  (Oldfield,  1971).  Subjects  took  part  in  two  separate  fMRI 
sessions. Subjects were informed that they would receive monetary reward related to their 
performance. 
 
5.2.2  Experimental Procedure 
We  again  integrated  the  slightly  modified  Monetary  Incentive  Delay  (MID)  Task 
(Knutson et al., 2001; see section 4.2.2; Fig. 1a) into a multi-trial reward schedule paradigm. 
An individual response time criterion was set on the basis of each participant‟s response times 
to ensure that participants would succeed on ~80 % of the trials. In the present experiment, we 
adapted the multi-trial reward schedule paradigm from Shidara and Richmond (2002; Fig. 7).  
The  length  of  schedules  varied  from  one  to  three  consecutive  MID  Trials.  Reward 
schedules were again embedded in a delayed or an immediate contingency condition. In the 
delayed contingency condition, subjects received a monetary reward of 18 euro-cents only 
after successful completion of all consecutive trials within one schedule. In the immediate 
condition, subjects earned a reward of 18 euro-cents after every correct trial. This resulted in a 
design with three factors, i.e., contingency (2 levels: delayed and immediate), schedule length 
(3 levels: 1, 2, or 3 MID trials), and position within schedule (number of positions depending 
on schedule length).  
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Figure 7. Multitrial reward schedules. Schedules consisted of 1 to 3 MID trials. In the delayed contingency 
condition,  subjects  received  a  reward  of  18  euro-cents  only  after  the  successful  completion  of  the  whole 
schedule. In the immediate contingency condition, subjects received a reward of 18 euro-cents after every trial. 
An instruction screen at the beginning of each schedule notified participants about the number of MID trials in 
the current schedule. Feedback was given after every single trial. Delayed and immediate contingency were 
presented block-wise. 
 
Contingency was indexed by both an instruction screen (2 s; “delayed” / “immediate”) at 
the beginning of each contingency block and a corresponding, colored rectangular frame. 
Prior to the beginning of each reward schedule a second instruction screen (2 s) informed 
participants about the number of MID trials of the current schedule (“1” / “2” / “3”). The 
colored rectangular frame corresponding to  the current  contingency condition  was  on the 
screen  throughout  the  sequence  of  MID  trials.  The  mapping  of  colors  to  conditions  was 
balanced across participants. In addition, feedback was given after every single trial, and this 
feedback screen additionally informed concerning the contingency condition and the current 
position within a schedule (e.g., 18/18 at any position in the immediate condition, or 6/18 at 
the 1
st position in the delayed 3-action-schedule, or 9/18 at the 1
st position in the delayed 2-
action-schedule). Delayed and immediate contingency blocks were presented alternately with 
a  duration  of  approximately  four  minutes  each,  comprising  between  9  and  17  reward 
schedules  per  block.  The  number  of  reward  schedules  per  block  varied  according  to  the 
relative  distribution  of  reward  schedules  with  longer  and  shorter  schedule  lengths.  The    Imaging Study 2       
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number of MID trials within one reward schedule (schedule length) was randomized within 
the contingency blocks. 
Whenever  participants  made  an  error  in  any  of  the  trials  in  the  delayed  contingency 
conditions, the schedule was aborted and no reward was given. Participants were informed 
that no substitutional reward schedules would be presented for aborted schedules, to prevent 
them from intentionally skipping schedules of three actions (as they were less profitable in 
comparison  to  2-action-schedules  and  1-action-schedules).  Without  the  participants‟ 
knowledge, however, after an error additional reward schedules were added to the end of a 
contingency block until the block length of approximately four minutes was completed, with 
the aim of assuring sufficient trial numbers. Responding late, not responding at all, and a 
wrong  button  press  constituted  an  error.  In  the  immediate  condition,  the  trial  sequence 
continued in case of an error. Only completely correct schedules were included into the fMRI 
analyses. 
Averaged across participants the experiment consisted of 50.20 schedules in the delayed 
contingency conditions  (i.e., averaged over delayed schedules with a length of 1, 2, or 3 
actions) and 43.95 schedules in  the immediate  contingency condition  (i.e., averaged over 
immediate  schedules  with  a  length  of  1,  2,  or  3  actions).  Given  that  delayed  multitrial 
schedules were aborted after incorrect responses and that only completely correct schedules 
were included, the actual number in the fMRI analyses varied between 20.89 and 38.39 per 
single condition, i.e., per contingency, schedule length and position in schedule (e.g., delayed, 
schedule length of 3 actions, 2
nd position; cf. Results section).  
Between contingency blocks a white crosshair was displayed for 12 s. The trial-to-trial 
intervals within contingency blocks varied between 3 and 7 s and were randomized across 
conditions. After each schedule, a small cross-hair was displayed before the next schedule 
began. The experiment was acquired in two scanning sessions, each of which lasted about 60 
minutes. Subjects were trained, without reward, for 15 minutes prior to scanning. 
 
5.2.3  fMRI Procedure 
The experiment was carried out on a 3T scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, 
Germany). Subjects were positioned head first and supine in the magnet bore. First, 176 high-   Imaging Study 2       
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resolution anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence (TR 
= 2530 ms, TE = 2.58 ms, image matrix = 256 x 256, FOV = 220 mm, flip angle = 7°, slice 
thickness = 0.90 mm, voxel size = 0.9 x 0.86 x 0.86 mm (resized to 1 x 1 x 1 mm)). Whole 
brain functional images were collected using a T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence, 
sensitive to blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 35 ms, 
image matrix = 64 x 64, FOV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80°, slice thickness = 3 mm, voxel size 
3.5 x 3.5 . 3 mm, 30  axial slices). On average, 410 images were acquired per run.  
 
5.2.4  fMRI Analysis 
Preprocessing,  subject-level  statistical  analyses,  and  the  calculation  of  subject-specific 
contrast images of fMRI data were performed analogous to Experiment 1. The main events of 
interest  for  the  event-related  analysis  were  again  the  reward  anticipation  phases  of  each 
condition.  We  calculated  a  general  linear  model  (GLM)  for  each  subject  that  included 
separate predictors for the anticipation phase of each trial type, as defined by contingency and 
position in the respective schedule consisting of one, two, or three trials. The outcome phases 
of all trial types  were again  modeled as  a single predictor.  In this  experiment  the cross-
correlation coefficients between anticipation and outcome phases ranged between 0.0897 and 
0.2643. 
Resulting group SPMs were thresholded at t > 3.65 (p < 0.001, uncorrected). To protect 
against  false  positive  activations,  we  used  the  double-threshold  approach  combining  the 
voxel-based threshold with a minimum cluster size (Forman et al., 1995). This nonarbitrary 
cluster size was again determined on the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation (1,000 iterations) 
using  AFNI's  AlphaSim  tool  (Ward,  2000;  http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni).  This  yielded  a 
cluster size of 91 voxels. Activations exceeding this threshold are considered to be activated 
at an experiment-wise threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons. Results are 
again displayed on an average image of the study participants‟ brain. 
To  identify  effects  of  previously  invested  effort  on  both  behavioral  performance  and 
neuronal activity, we compared the last actions of 2-action schedules and 3-action schedules 
with  respect  to  delayed  and  immediate  contingency  conditions.  In  this  comparison,  the 
anticipated reward size (i.e., 18 euro-cents) and the position in schedule are held constant, 
with the only difference being the amount of previously invested effort. To check for the    Imaging Study 2       
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influence of the motivational context on error rates and brain activity, we compared the 1-
action schedules between the differential contingency conditions. Importantly, these trials are 
completely  identical  with  the  exception  of  the  experimental  context  in  which  they  are 
presented, i.e., an immediate reward vs. a delayed reward context, in which the risk of sinking 
costs, i.e., loosing previously invested effort, is substantially higher.  
Furthermore, we assessed whether or not functional connectivities between brain regions 
were modulated by previously invested effort. To this end, we conducted psychophysiological 
interaction  analyses  (Friston  et  al.,  1997)  with  mid-LPFC  as  a  seed  region  (cf.  Results 
section). The seed region was the same for all participants and was defined with the contrast 
delayed versus immediate contingency, averaged across positions and schedule lengths, with a 
threshold of p = 0.99. For the PPI analysis, a novel GLM was set up that encompassed three 
regressors,  i.e.,  the  time  series  from  the  seed  region  as  a  physiological  predictor,  the 
previously  invested  effort  (delayed  versus  immediate  last  actions  of  multitrial  reward 
schedules) as psychological predictor, as well as the interaction of these two variables which 
served as the psychophysiological interaction term. The second-level random effects analysis 
of  the  psychophysiological  interaction  term  was  thresholded  at  the  whole  brain  level  as 
described above. 
As  we  had  strong  hypotheses  concerning  a  contribution  of  the  RCZ  to  effort-related 
coupling with our seed region we additionally looked specifically for effects in this area. To 
this  end,  we  used  the  same  anatomical  mask  of  the  RCZ  as  in  our  previous  study.  The 
minimal  cluster  size  to  ensure  an  overall  image-wise  false  positive  rate  of  5%  for  an 
individual voxel height threshold of T > 3.65 (p < 0.001, uncorrected) was any activation 
exceeding a size of 17 voxels.  
 
5.3  Results 
5.3.1  Behavioral Data 
On average, participants performed without any error in 25.94 (51.69% [SE 3.6]) delayed-
3-action-schedules,  in  31.44  (62.66%  [SE  3.6])  delayed-2-action  schedules  and  in  38.39 
(78.90%  [SE  2.2])  trials  of  the  delayed-1-action-schedules.  In  the  immediate  contingency 
condition  schedules  were  performed  without  errors  in  20.89  (46.85%  [SE  3.3])  3-action-   Imaging Study 2       
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schedules, in 27.50 (62.18% [SE 3.5]) 2-action-schedules, and 34.06 (78.00% [SE 2.5]) 1-
action  schedules.  As  single  trial  types  (e.g.,  delayed,  schedule  length  of  three  trials,  3
rd 
position) were only included in the analyses when the complete corresponding schedule (e.g., 
delayed  3-action-schedule)  was  performed  without  any  error,  the  number  of  correctly 
completed  schedules  corresponds  to  trial  numbers  (in  the  sense  of  numbers  of  trials  per 
contingency, schedule length, and position) included in the analysis of reaction times and 
fMRI data. The analysis of percentage of fully completed multitrial reward schedules revealed 
an inherent main effect of schedule length (F(1,17) = 113.7, p < 0.001). Furthermore, subjects 
tended to  perform  better in  delayed  as  compared to  immediate schedules (main  effect  of 
contingency (F(1,17) = 3.7, p = 0.072), but the two factors did not interact (interaction effect 
between schedule length and contingency (F(1,17) = 1.2, p = 0.309). 
Our main focus of interest was the comparison of percentage of errors between the final 
trials of multi-trial reward schedules (i.e., 2
nd trial in 2-actions-schedules and 3
rd trial in 3-
actions schedules) with respect to the different contingency conditions (delayed vs. immediate 
contingency). Under both delayed and immediate contingency subjects expected a reward of 
18 euro-cents after completion of the last action with the only difference being the previously 
invested effort to obtain this reward. Analysis of variance revealed that error rates differed 
with respect to the factor contingency (F(1,17) = 14.2, p = 0.002; cf. Fig. 8), but were neither 
modulated by schedule length in isolation (F(1,17) = 0.1, p = 0.723) nor by the interaction 
between contingency and schedule length (F(1,17) = 3.1, p = 0.098). This indicates that the 
previous  invested  effort  in  general  leads  to  a  performance  enhancement,  while  the 
manipulation of the amount of effort expenditure (2 vs. 3 action steps towards the goal) did 
not affect performance significantly. 
When averaging across the single positions in the schedules, we found that subjects made 
relatively fewer errors under delayed as compared to immediate reward contingency (main 
effect of contingency: F(1,17) = 6.4, p = 0.022), even though the net reward that could be 
gained under delayed contingency was smaller. Error rates were not significantly influenced 
by schedule length (F(1,17) = 0.1, p = 0.901) and the two factors did not interact (F(1,17) = 
1.0, p = 0.387).  
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Figure  8.  Error  rates  (%)  in  the  last  actions  of  3-action  schedules  and  2-action  schedules.  Performance  is 
enhanced under delayed contingency, i.e., after higher effort expenditure, but independent of the amount of 
previously invested effort. del, delayed; imm, immediate.  
 
The only significant reaction time effect was reached in the main effect of position in the 
2-action-schedule (F(1,17) = 22.3, p < 0.001). All other reaction time analysis yielded a p > 
0.1, which is probably due to the reduced variance in reaction times due to the individually set 
response time criterion.  
We conclude that performance was in general enhanced after previously invested effort. 
At  the  same  time  error  rates  were  not  modulated  by  the  amount  of  effort  invested  (i.e., 
schedule length). In addition, we found a decrease in error rates under delayed as compared to 
immediate contingency, while the experimental context itself (i.e., the comparison between 
the  delayed  1-action  schedule  and  the  immediate  1-action  schedules)  did  not  seem  to 
influence behavioral performance.  
 
5.3.2  fMRI Data 
Neuronal Correlates of Differential Effort for Equal Reward Magnitude 
Our primary interest lies in the effect of previously invested effort on the valuation of an 
outcome given the expectation of equal reward magnitude. To this end, we contrasted the    Imaging Study 2       
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delayed  and  immediate  multi-trial  reward  schedules  only  with  respect  to  the  anticipation 
phases of their final trials. On the basis of the behavioral results (cf. Behavioral Data), we 
collapsed our analysis across the amount of effort expenditure (i.e., 2
nd trials in 2-actions-
schedules and 3
rd trials in 3-actions schedules for both immediate and delayed contingency 
condition). In these conditions, subjects invariably expected a reward of 18 euro-cents. The 
only difference between delayed and immediate conditions lies in the effort participants had 
invested  to  gain  the  predicted  reward,  prior  to  the  current  trial.  More  specifically,  under 
delayed contingency, participants had successfully completed the one (or two) preceding trials 
of the multitrial schedule, while the one (two) preceding trials were of no relevance for the 
current  outcome  in  the  immediate  condition.  An  additional  variable  inherent  to  this 
comparison was the risk of potential loss of previously invested effort in case of an error.  
The  analysis  identified  several  activation  cluster  associated  with  general  cognitive 
processing (Wager et al., 2004; Owen et al., 2005) including several regions in the lateral 
prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area 9 (BA9), BA44, BA45, and BA10) and posterior medial 
frontal  cortex  (comprising  wide  parts  of  the  rostral  cingulate  zone  [RCZ],  and  pre-
supplementary  [pre-SMA]  and  supplementary  motor  areas  [SMA];  Fig.  9;  Table  4). 
Additionally we found activation in bilateral posterior parietal cortex, anterior Insula, and the 
head of the caudate nucleus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Group functional activation maps, overlaid on the average of the normalized structural images of the 
study  participants.  The  contrast  of  differential  effort  expenditure  for  equal  reward  magnitude  revealed  a 
widespread network of activation clusters in the (a) lateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, anterior 
insula, and in the (b) rostral cingulate zone, supplementary, and pre-supplementary motor areas. Images are 
thresholded at p < .001, k > 91. 
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Table 4. MNI coordinates and anatomical locations of the peak activations for the contrast of differential effort 
expenditure to obtain a reward of equal magnitude. 
  Peak voxel (in mm)   
Brain region  cluster size  x  y  z  voxel T 
Mid-Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (mid-
LPFC) (BA 9/10) 
447  34  46  16  5.63 
¹ Precentral Gyrus   2269  50  -8  50  6.41 
¹ Posterior Lateral Prefrontal Cortex 
(post-LPFC) (BA 44/45) 
  44  14  24  5.82 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 45)  297  -34  34  4  6.29 
² Rostral Cingulate Zone (RCZ)  1652  6  12  32  5.94 
² Supplementary Motor Area (SMA)    0  -8  70  5.70 
² Pre-Supplementary Motor Area     6  18  58  5.59 
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus  812  16  16  48  5.56 
Precuneus  241  10  -38  64  5.28 
Superior Parietal Lobe  1436  28  -68  44  5.84 
Insula  231  -42  8  16  5.64 
Nucleus Caudatus  151  -6  6  6  4.82 
Thalamus  91  0  -28  2  5.44 
Occipital Cortex  141  40  -84  6  5.04 
Occipital Cortex  870  -22  -66  10  4.73 
¹ wide network in the lateral frontal cortex.    ² wide network in the medial frontal cortex.    Imaging Study 2       
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Functional Connectivity of the Mid-LPFC 
We next aimed at examining whether or not the manipulation of effort expenditure would 
also  influence  the  functional  connectivity  between  lateral  and  medial  frontal  regions  (cf. 
Kouneiher et al, 2009). Accordingly, we explored the functional connectivity pattern of the 
mid-LPFC, a region that showed a clear effort related effect in both hemispheres and is more 
generally  associated  with  the  integration  of  reward  expectation  and  the  selection  and 
preparation  of  actions  during  the  pursuit  of  behavioral  goals  (Ramnani  &  Miall,  2003; 
Ramnani & Owen, 2004). We applied psychophysiological interaction analysis (Friston et al., 
1997)  to  the  contrast  of  differential  invested  effort  for  equal  reward  magnitude.  The 
physiological predictor was the time series from the seed region, i.e., the mid-LPFC activation 
cluster that responded stronger to higher previous invested effort. It was modulated by the 
contrast  of  differential  invested  effort  for  equal  reward  magnitude  (i.e.,  psychological 
predictor).  Analysis  of  the  psychophysiological  interaction  term,  which  reflects  the  effort 
related change in functional coupling with the mid-LPFC seed region (x,y,z =34,46,16; Fig. 
10a), revealed an effect in the SMA (x,y,z =-6,-8,60; Fig. 10b) and in the thalamus (x,y,z = 
16,-14,6). In addition, we expected an effect in the RCZ both due to literature (Kouneiher et 
al., 2009) and due to findings in our first study concerning the crucial role of the RCZ in 
effort-based valuation. Accordingly, we focused on this area in a ROI analysis using the same 
RCZ mask as in the previous study. Corresponding to our hypothesis, we found significant 
effects in the pRCZ (x,y,z = 10,8,-42; x,y,z =8,-8,38; Fig. 10c).  
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Figure 10. The seed region in the mid-LPFC (a) exhibited an increased functional connectivity to supplementary 
motor area (b, SMA, thresholded at p < 0.001, k > 91) and rostral cingulate zone (c, RCZ) after higher previous 
effort investment. RCZ mask is visualized in transparent red, activations within the mask are thresholded at p < 
0.001, k > 17. 
 
No Differential Effect of the Amount of Previously Invested Effort  
Furthermore, we were interested whether or not there was a neuronal effect of the amount 
of previous effort expenditure. Analogous to the analysis of the behavioral data, we compared 
the final trials of multi-trial reward schedules (i.e., 2
nd trial in 2-actions-schedules and 3
rd trial 
in  3-actions  schedules)  with  respect  to  the  different  contingency  conditions  (delayed  vs. 
immediate contingency) on the whole brain level. If one region is modulated through the 
amount of previously invested effort to obtain a reward of equal magnitude, it should exhibit a 
significant  interaction  between  contingency  and  schedule  length.  Actually,  no  region 
displayed such a significant interaction effect under the chosen significance criterion. This 
corresponds to the behavioral results, where also no sensitivity to the amount of invested 
effort as operationalized in the present study could be identified. 
 
Representation of the Experimental Context 
By contrasting the anticipation phases of 1-action schedules, we additionally examined 
how the brain represents the motivational context of a situation. As the 1-action-schedules    Imaging Study 2       
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consist  of  only  one  MID  Trial,  they  are  completely  identical  under  both  contingency 
conditions. The only difference is the experimental context they are embedded in (delayed vs. 
immediate contingency block). The comparison yielded exactly two activation foci in left 
orbitofrontal cortex (BA10 ; x,y,z =-38,48,-2) and left posterior LPFC (BA9; x,y,z =-46,16,30) 
(Fig. 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Group functional activation map, overlaid on the average of the normalized structural images of the 
study participants. Activation in posterior lateral prefrontal cortex (post-LPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in 
the contrast of 1-action schedules that were embedded in the delayed vs. the immediate contingency context. The 
image is thresholded at p < 0.001, k > 91. 
 
5.4  Discussion 
The present study examined behavioral and neural responses to previously invested effort 
in a multitrial reward schedule paradigm. We found that the fraction of correctly completed 
trials to obtain a reward of equal magnitude was increased after higher effort expenditure. 
Accordingly, invested effort influenced the motivational values of action outcomes.  
We  furthermore  identified  a  wide  network  of  brain  regions  previously  shown  to  be 
engaged in cognitive control functions that was modulated after a prior investment has been 
made. This could indicate that previous effort investment acts on cognitive control processes 
concerned  with  optimal  task  performance.  More  precisely,  invested  effort  potentially 
influences  the  allocation  of  cognitive  control  resources  into  task  performance  through  an 
enhanced  connectivity  between  mid-lateral  prefrontal  cortex  and  medial  frontal  cortex 
regions, i.e., SMA and RCZ. In addition, posterior lateral prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal 
cortex seem to represent the contextual frame based on the risk of loosing already invested 
effort that could be used for reference-dependent outcome evaluation.    Imaging Study 2       
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5.4.1  Invested  Effort  Engages  a  Network  Associated  with  Executive 
Control Functions 
In a recent behavioral study with non-human primates, La Camera and Richmond (2008) 
found a significant tendency for errors to decrease with the trials already performed, at equal 
proximity  to  reward.  Also  in  the  present  study,  the  previous  invested  effort  led  to  a 
performance enhancement as measured in the final trials of multitrial reward schedules that 
varied  according  to  the  number  of  actions  until  reward  attainment.  This  phenomenon  is 
referred to as “schedule length effect”. As performance accuracy in general is guided by the 
motivational value of an anticipated outcome and given that all other operant demands of the 
last  actions  between schedules under delayed  or immediate  contingency  are  constant,  the 
schedule length effect can be taken as a direct consequence of motivational value modulation 
due to previous workload.  
As neuronal underpinnings of the schedule length effect we observed an activation of 
several regions in the lateral prefrontal cortex, posterior medial frontal cortex, supplementary 
motor areas, parietal cortex, and insular cortex, all regions commonly associated with higher 
level cognitive functions (Wager et al., 2004; Owen et al., 2005). The present study provides 
the  first  evidence  that  the  previously  invested  effort  can  elicit  processes  concerned  with 
general cognitive processing and future planning. However, it was not designed to address the 
question whether the identified areas may code for an effort-based value representation or 
whether their activity is due to a general effect of motivation increasing task-specific activity 
in  order  maximize  reward  attainment.  As  can  be  seen  from  the  following  sections  both 
interpretations are feasible. 
One the one hand, it is a known fact that executive functions must intersect with functions 
that determine value for the organism. In line with this, functional imaging work in humans 
(Small et al., 2005; Adcock et al., 2006; Krawczyk et al, 2007; Locke & Braver, 2008) and 
single-unit recording in non-human primates (Kennerley & Wallis, 2009c) provide evidence 
that changes in motivational state may modulate performance through activity in task-related 
cognitive control regions.  
Interestingly,  on  the  other  hand,  McClure  and  colleagues  (2004,  2007)  identified  a 
comparable  network  contributing  to  the  value  determination  of  time-discounted  rewards. 
More precisely, they found that the degree of engagement of a wide part of this network,    Imaging Study 2       
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namely several regions in the DLPFC (BAs 9, 44, 46, and 10), bilateral parietal cortex, and 
anterior insula predict deferral of gratification during intertemporal choices. The increased 
activity of this so-called δ-decision making system in response to the selection of a later/larger 
reward is consistent with a key role of this network for cognitive processes such as general 
reasoning,  abstract  problem  solving,  and  exertion  of  control  in  favor  of  long-term  goals 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001). These processes putatively underlie the uniquely human capacity for 
future  planning.  Damage  to  these  areas  in  humans  produces  a  pattern  of  short-sighted 
nondeliberative behavior termed “reward-dependency syndrome” (Lhermitte, 1986). Notably, 
this network was previously not only identified in the context of time discounting, but also 
during the valuation of probabilistic decision options (Peters & Buchel, 2009), potentially 
indicating that the identified regions are engaged in a domain-general analysis of economic 
options and the valuation of future reward.  
While the same general δ-regions may be involved in a variety of functions (Shallice, 
1982; Miller & Cohen, 2001) limbic reward-related β-areas seem to be more stimulus or task 
specific. The specific subregions of the limbic β-decision system were shown to be sensitive 
to different aspects of common decision variables as for example the person-specific scaling 
of  delayed  decision  options  (Kable  &  Glimcher,  2007),  and  the  tracking  of  a  reward-
probability functions (Hsu et al., 2009). It is an open question if limbic subregions also show 
a graded sensitivity with respect to invested effort as opposed to the putative binary coding in 
domain general cognitive control regions identified in the present study.    
 
5.4.2  Invested  Effort  Enhances  Functional  Connectivity  between  Medial 
and Lateral Frontal Regions 
As  mentioned  above,  previously  invested  effort  induces  a  modulation  of  potentially 
cognitive control-related neuronal activity. In the present study, we could show that RCZ and 
SMA exhibit an increased functional connectivity to mid-LPFC in the face of higher effort 
expenditure. This is similar to the connectivity profile shown by Kouneiher and colleagues 
(2009) varying as a function of reward magnitude when participants performed a cognitive 
demanding task. Following their argumentation, RCZ and SMA could provide an effort-based 
cost-benefit analysis used for the regulation of task-dependent cognitive control resources by 
the mid-LPFC. In line with this, the mid-LPFC has been associated with a variety of cognitive    Imaging Study 2       
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control processes subserving the pursuit of hierarchical goals (e.g., Ramnani & Owen, 2004). 
For example, the mid-LPFC has been implicated in subgoal processing, i.e., taking a larger 
goal and breaking it down into smaller goals (Koechlin et al., 1999; Braver & Bongiolatti, 
2002). The execution of a varying number of action steps, i.e., subgoals, towards a delayed 
reward, i.e., the hierarchically larger goal, might have been governed by exactly this type of 
cognitive control process. Also anatomically, the mid-LPFC seems to be ideally suited to 
govern cognitive processes according to the values of expected outcomes. It receives input 
from orbitofrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, and dopaminergic midbrain (Ilinsky, Jouandet, & 
Goldman-Rakic, 1985; Preuss & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Ungerleider, Gaffan, & Pelak, 1989; 
Petrides & Pandya, 2002), all regions from where value information could arrive. In turn, it 
projects to dorsolateral prefrontal and premotor regions, and could, thus, influence behavioral 
output (Preuss & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Petrides & Pandya, 2002).  
On the other hand, in a recent study, it was argued that mid-LPFC represents a combined 
value signal integrating reward size, risk, and even personal risk attitudes of the decision 
maker (Tobler et al., 2009). In the last actions of the delayed contingency condition, the risk 
of loosing previously invested effort is substantially higher than in the immediate contingency 
condition.  Furthermore,  the  RCZ  was  shown  in  our  first  study  to  represent  the  expected 
reward value integrated with the previously invested effort to obtain that reward. Therefore, 
this connectivity could also enable a combined value representation in the mid-LPFC based 
on  the  risk  of  loosing  previously  invested  effort.  As  indicated  by  the  behavioral 
manifestations of potential sunk-cost situations, the prevention of loosing previously invested 
effort is a strong motivational factor in peoples‟ decisions (Arkes & Ayton, 1999). Thus, 
together with the increased coupling to the SMA, the connectivity profile could also indicate 
an enhanced degree of motivation reflected by an increased  level of motor readiness and 
movement preparation (Pears et al., 2003; Roesch & Olson, 2007b).  
Taken  together,  both  the  widespread  activation  of  brain  regions  and  the  increased 
functional coupling due to increased effort expenditure are potentially related to the enhanced 
behavioral task performance after higher effort expenditure. More general, they might also 
underlie the behavioral manifestation of the sunk cost effect, i.e., the increased motivation to 
spend resources in a course of actions once an investment of effort has been made. However, 
whether this is due to the additional allocation of task-related resources or the integration of 
effort based value information recruiting the same brain regions as typical cognitive control 
tasks is behind the scope of the present study.     Imaging Study 2       
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5.4.3  Previous Effort Investment Serves as a Contextual Frame Used for 
Outcome Evaluation 
The sunk cost fallacy is uniformly seen as a contextual framing effect based on previous 
effort expenditure, eventually resulting in the differential valuation of potentially equivalent 
decision  options.  We  found  the  posterior  LPFC  and  the  OFC  to  be  concerned  with 
maintaining such a context representation. Importantly, by comparing 1-action schedules with 
respect to contingency conditions,  this context representation could be investigated in the 
absence  of  other  valuation-related  processes.  As  the  risk  of  sinking  costs  is  substantially 
higher in the delayed contingency context, the higher activation in the posterior LPFC and 
lateral OFC in this condition could represent the contextual frame itself used as a reference 
point for relative outcome valuation. 
In  general,  both  human  neuroimaging  and  monkey  neurophysiological  studies  clearly 
indicate  that  the  posterior  LPFC  plays  significant  roles  in  processing  cognitive  context 
information (Koechlin et al., 2003; Brass & Cramon, 2004; Watanabe & Sakagami, 2007). 
For  instance,  primate  caudal  LPFC  neurons  seem  to  be  involved  in  cognitive  context-
dependent stimulus coding, e.g., by responding differently to an identical stimulus according 
to the current task situation (Watanabe & Sakagami, 2007). Also in the human brain, post-
LPFC was associated with the selection of task-relevant information indicated by changing 
contextual cues (Brass & von Cramon, 2004).  
Furthermore,  in  addition  to  encoding  the  cognitive  context  of  the  environment,  the 
posterior  lateral  prefrontal  cortex  might  represent  the  utilities  or  values  associated  with 
various states of the environment, thus also coding the stimuli on the basis of the motivational 
context  (Lee,  Rushworth,  Walton,  Watanabe,  &  Sakagami  2007;  Watanabe  &  Sakagami, 
2007). This has previously also been suggested in fMRI studies with human subjects where 
the motivational context varied according to the probability of rewarding outcomes (Tanaka et 
al.,  2004;  Huettel  et  al.,  2006b).  In  the  present  study,  the  risk  of  sinking  cost  might  be 
processed in the posterior LPFC as a strong incentive to select and maintain the accordant task 
representation, i.e., which button to press as soon as the target appears. 
Also the OFC was significantly activated when comparing delayed with immediate 1-
action schedules.  In contrast  to  the posterior  LPFC, the OFC seems  to  be predominantly 
involved in coding for motivational context information (Watanabe & Sakagami, 2007). The    Imaging Study 2       
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increased activity in the OFC might therefore represent the frame, i.e., the reference point 
itself, and through this might also underlie the subjective evaluation of an equal reward after 
differential effort expenditure. This fits well with various reports about relative value coding 
in the OFC, which activity adapts to the range of values available in a given context (e.g., 
Tremblay & Schultz, 1999; Ursu & Carter, 2005).  
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6  General Discussion 
 
In the theoretical background section of the present thesis, previous research on valuation 
related processes and the role of associated brain regions has been introduced. This review of 
the literature showed that most of the present research in this field pertains to absolute value 
representations  modulated  by  decision  variables  like  reward  size  (e.g.,  Hollerman  et  al., 
1998), probability (e.g., Huettel et al., 2005), temporal delay (e.g., McClure et al., 2004), and 
expected effort (e.g., Croxson et al., 2009). A parallel line of evidence is concerned with the 
investigation how value is computed relatively, i.e., with respect to the current context of the 
situation. In these studies, contextual attributes of a situation modulating the evaluation of a 
decision option are, for example, the price range of the available options (Padoa-Schioppa, 
2009) or the satiety state of the individual (Gottfried et al., 2003). 
The  present  thesis  focused  on  the  influence  of  goal  proximity  and  invested  effort  as 
decision variables modulating the estimation of value, and, in the case of invested effort, also 
as a contextual anchor for value evaluation. Thus far, at least in the field of human cognitive 
neuroscience,  these  variables  have  not  been  investigated  systematically.  In  the  following 
sections, the results of the two studies comprising the present thesis will be summarized. 
Furthermore,  some  suggestions  will  be  made  on  how  the  present  experiment  on  effort 
expenditure can be continued to further specify the role of the associated brain regions.  
 
6.1  Summary of the Behavioral Results 
In both studies reported here, performance was enhanced under delayed contingency, even 
though this did not lead to an increase in reward size. While in the first study the contingency 
conditions did not differ with respect to the overall net reward, in the second study, the net 
reward  that  could  be  gained  under  delayed  contingency  was  even  smaller  than  under 
immediate contingency. In addition, subjects made less errors in a trial if the total effort to get 
there had been larger, even though this does not affect the upcoming reward (“schedule length 
effect”). This indicates that participants were differentially motivated depending on previous 
workload  when  facing  a  situation  with  identical  reward/cost  ratio.  This  proves  that  the    General Discussion       
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performance  of  humans  in  the  reward  schedule  task  is  influenced  by  valuation  related 
processes based on invested effort.  
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  the  participants  did  not  only  strive  for 
maximizing the overall reward/cost ratio when performing in multitrial reward schedules, as 
commonly assumed in rational theories of decision making (La Camera & Richmond, 2008). 
Conversely, a number of experiments have supported the notion that the avoidance of wasting 
cost  already  is  a  strong  motivating  factor  in  people's  decision  (Arkes  &  Ayton,  1999). 
Correspondingly, the present behavioral effects could be due to an inherent aversion to loss, 
as in the delayed contingency condition, the risk of sinking already invested resources is 
substantially higher than in the immediate condition, and the degree to which already invested 
resources would be lost varies according to the effort already invested.   
In line with this, aversion to loss has been observed in other situations, in which subjects 
do not evaluate options in a rational, absolute way. For example, some researchers proposed 
that the endowment effect, i.e., the tendency to weigh products for sale more heavily than 
products  for  buy,  results  from  the  subjective  impression  of  loosing  the  sold  product 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler 1990, 1991). Also prospect theory, a successful behavioral 
model of decision-making under risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) explains risk aversion in 
gambles using the concept of loss aversion: People are more sensitive to the possibility of 
loosing money than they are to the possibility of gaining the same amount of money. Thus far, 
this is the first study in humans using multitrial reward schedule paradigms showing that also 
increasing  goal  proximity  and  invested  effort  can  produce  effects  explainable  with  loss 
aversion.  Reasonably,  also  the  behavioral  manifestation  of  the  sunk  cost  fallacy,  i.e.,  the 
increased motivation to persist in a course of actions once an investment of effort has been 
made, results from the aversion of loss that obviously drives human choice behavior. 
 
6.2  Summary of the Neuronal Results 
According to the two experiments of the present thesis, reward proximity and invested 
effort influence neural systems concerned with goal based valuation mainly in the prefrontal 
cortex. In general, over the past decade, much research has been done in the field of decision 
making and associated valuation-related processes. It has become clear that reward signals are 
ubiquitous in the frontal lobe (Schultz, 2010), which is not surprising given that a central goal    General Discussion       
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of behavior is to obtain rewards of all kinds. In the following, the results of the two imaging 
studies will be repeated. Based on the results of the first study, the role of the RCZ with 
respect to valuation based processes will be specified. Furthermore, potential criticism and 
unclarities about the precise functionality of brain regions identified in the second study will 
be addressed. 
 
6.2.1  RCZ Represents Action Values based on Goal Proximity 
In line with our hypothesis, the first experiment demonstrated that the human pRCZ is, 
like  the  CMA  in  monkeys,  highly  specialized  in  value  representation  contingent  to  the 
proximity of the expected outcome in a series of routine actions leading to a delayed reward. 
According to studies trying to specify the role of pMFC regions in outcome evaluation, value 
representation in the RCZ is putatively based on the calculation of the value of the action 
producing a certain outcome (for a review see Rushworth et al., 2004; Rushworth, Buckley, 
Behrens,  Walton,  &  Bannerman,  2007).  Also  our  functional  connectivity  analysis, 
demonstrating that the reward proximity signal in the pRCZ covaries with activity in motor-
related regions, and, more generally, the anatomical finding that much of the primate medial 
frontal cortex projects to cortical and subcortical areas with motor functions (Dum & Strick, 
1991) provides evidence that the activity of the RCZ is modulated primarily with regard to the 
rewarding values of actions, thus enabling efficient action selection. In line with this, lesions 
in the pMFC impair rodents‟ ability to  combine information about the costs and benefits 
associated with alternative actions (Rudebeck et al., 2006). Thus, in sum, the results of our 
first imaging study show for the first time that the role of the human RCZ in representing 
action values can be extended to the continuous updating of action values over a routine 
action course with regards to the proximity to the expected goal.  
 
6.2.2  The Neuronal Effects of Invested Effort 
Importantly,  in  multitrial  reward  schedules,  previously  invested  effort  influences  two 
kinds of valuation related process. On the one hand, invested effort can function as a decision 
variable accumulating over action steps towards the predicted outcome. On the other hand, 
invested effort can be conceptualized as a reference point for relative outcome evaluation.     General Discussion       
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Neuronal correlates of the schedule length effect. In both studies of the present thesis, 
we measured the influence of invested effort in terms of a decision variable that accumulates 
over action steps by comparing the final trials of the delayed as compared to the immediate 
multitrial reward schedules. This comparison is also referred to as “schedule length” effect. 
In the first study, when investigating the schedule length effect after the execution of 
routine actions towards reward, we found an anterior part of the RCZ to code for previous 
effort expenditure. This result suggests that the RCZ integrates action values also with respect 
to the workload already invested, which is furthermore in line with the finding that RCZ 
codes for a higher number of decision variables than any other regions in the frontal cortex 
(Kennerley et al., 2009a). 
In the second study, we extended our findings about the neuronal underpinnings of the 
schedule length effect towards the execution of non-routine action sequences. In line with our 
hypothesis, we found a broad network of cognitive control regions changing their activity 
dependent on previous effort expenditure to obtain a reward of equal magnitude. However, on 
the basis of the second study, we were not able to further disentangle the precise functionality 
of the identified regions in effort based valuation. For example, we could not find a variation 
in  any  of  these  regions  dependent  on  the  amount  of  previous  effort  investment.  Also 
behaviorally, the amount of effort expenditure did not yield a significant effect. This could be 
due to the fact that the differentiation of previous workload as operationalized in the present 
study, i.e., 2 vs. 3 action steps towards the reward, does not make a difference for the scaling 
mechanism  implemented  in  the  human  brain  for  the  computation  of  value  based  on 
differential effort expenditure. Additionally, as in the second study delayed and immediate 
contingency conditions were not balanced according to reward magnitude, we were not able 
to investigate whether or not the activity in any of the effort-related brain regions also shows 
goal proximity-based valuation effects. This could have revealed which of the identified brain 
regions is specifically activated in response to previously invested effort, and which brain 
regions code for the expected value also with respect to goal proximity, thus in a more domain 
general way.  
An alternative interpretation of the neuronal correlates of the schedule length effect is that 
a general increase in motivation  due to previous effort investment modulated task-related 
activity  in  classical  cognitive  control  regions.  Admittedly,  this  conclusion  has  a  major 
weakness.  For proving that  invested effort can  influence executive processes it would be    General Discussion       
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necessary to show that it modulates the representation of information related to executive 
control,  thereby  ensuring  the  efficient  allocation  of  cognitive  resources.  However,  as 
executive control demands and previous effort investment did not vary independently from 
each other in the second study, we could not investigate whether or not there are brain regions 
changing  their  activity  both  due  to  manipulations  of  cognitive  load  and  the  motivational 
incentive  due  to  effort  investment.  Conversely,  we  could  only  speculate  that  a  higher 
performance monitoring demand, requiring a higher degree of executive control, was present 
in the delayed as compared to immediate multitrial reward schedules, potentially resulting 
from the higher necessity to monitor action steps leading to a delayed reward compared to 
actions leading immediately to a reward.  
Taken  together,  a  parsimonious  interpretation  of  our  results  is  that  the  encoding  of 
invested effort invoked processes related to the executive system. This could be due to an 
effort based value representation recruiting the same brain regions as typical cognitive control 
tasks. In line with this, some studies identified a comparable network contributing to the value 
determination  of  time-discounted  rewards  and  to  the  valuation  of  probabilistic  decision 
options (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Peters & Buchel, 2009). An alternative interpretation is 
that invested effort interacts with task-related processes, thereby assuring efficient allocation 
of cognitive resources (e.g., Locke & Braver, 2008). In line with this, the sunk-cost literature 
has focused on resource allocation dependent on previous effort expenditure as one variation 
of this phenomenon (Navarro & Fantino, 2005). A suggestion to clarify the role of brain 
regions concerned with effort based valuation in a sequence of non-routine actions will be 
addressed in the “outlook” section of the present thesis.  
 
The  role  of  the  posterior  lateral  prefrontal  cortex  and  orbitofrontal  cortex  in 
context-dependent outcome valuation. As expected on the basis of the work discussed in 
the theoretical background section, we also found the post-LPFC and the OFC to be involved 
in another crucial component of outcome valuation. More precisely, we could identify the 
representation  of the  experimental context  itself, i.e., the risk of sinking  already invested 
effort, that could be used as a reference frame for relative value computation, in the absence 
of other motivational variables modulating the anticipated outcome.  
The post-LPFC is unequivocally associated with maintaining both cognitive (e.g., Brass & 
von  Cramon,  2004)  and  motivational  (Tanaka  et  al.,  2004;  Huettel  et  al,  2006b)  state    General Discussion       
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representations in order to identify optimal actions in a given environment (Lee et al., 2007). 
This suggests that, in the second study, a lateral prefrontal representation of the task context 
could have led to a more precise action preparation during the anticipation phase of the MID 
task in the delayed contingency condition.  
The exact role of the OFC, however, in attributing value as a change from a set reference 
point is still under debate. Interestingly, in a recent functional imaging study (De Martino, 
Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006) the ability to resist to framing effects was linked to the 
activation of the OFC. Following this interpretation, the OFC could account for the lacking 
behavioral effects of the comparison between delayed and immediate 1-action schedules in 
the second experiment. This resistance is of high importance in the real world, as the inability 
to resist irrelevant cues, like previous workload in outcome evaluation, can potentially lead to 
maladaptive  economic  behavior  as  can  be  seen,  for  example,  in  the  development  of  the 
Concorde.  The  plane's  vague  financial  prospects  were  known  long  before  the  plane  was 
completed, but the two governments financing the project decided to continue anyway on the 
grounds that they had already invested a lot of money. In short, they had "too much invested 
to quit" (Teger, 1980).  
Contrary to this, for many everyday decisions, perhaps a fast and frugal heuristic like 
"Past investment predicts future benefits" is a serviceable substitute for the computationally 
more demanding rules (Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, & Martignon, 1999). In evolutionary terms, 
these  context-  or  framing-dependent  evaluation  mechanism  may  even  confer  a  strong 
advantage, because contextual cues may carry useful, if not critical, motivational information 
(Pompilio, Kacelnik, & Behmer, 2006), and these mechanisms only fail in circumstances in 
which additional resources do not result in an increase in future benefits. However, given that 
past  investment  is  typically  correlated  with  prospective  value,  perhaps  the  cost  of 
vulnerability to the sunk cost fallacy is not as great as the benefits gained from use of such a 
computationally cheap rule. 
 
6.3  Conclusion 
The aim of the present thesis was to investigate for the first time which valuation related 
brain  regions  in  humans  are  modulated  by  the  proximity  to  the  expected  goal  and  the    General Discussion       
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previously  invested  effort,  two  variables  not  addressed  thus  far  in  numerous  human 
neuroimaging studies concerned with decision making and goal-based valuation.  
We could demonstrate that the RCZ of the pMFC signals increasing reward expectation 
contingent  to  goal  proximity,  thereby  replicating  neurophysiological  findings  about  goal 
proximity signals in a homologous region in non-human primates. Through this, we could 
extend the role of the  human RCZ in  outcome evaluation  to  include  also  the continuous 
updating of action values over a course of routine action steps based on the proximity to the 
expected reward.  
We further tentatively suggest that increased effort investment in order to obtain a reward 
of equal magnitude invokes processes related to the executive system, while the degree of 
invested  effort  does  not  necessarily  influence  the  degree  to  which  control  systems  are 
engaged. Additionally, we report for the first time that the posterior lateral prefrontal cortex 
and orbitofrontal cortex are concerned with maintaining a context representation based on the 
risk of sinking already invested effort which could serve as reference frame for relative value 
computation. 
 
6.4  Outlook 
The present experiments used fMRI to investigate which brain regions are modulated by 
goal proximity and invested effort. The results that were reported here led to the conclusion 
that, in a sequence of routine actions, RCZ represents action values based on goal proximity 
and previous effort expenditure.  
Furthermore, we provided evidence that in a course of non-routine actions, invested effort 
evokes  processes  related  the  executive  system.  However,  the  precise  roles  of  the  regions 
responding to increased effort expenditure need further clarification.  
One of our hypotheses states that the identified areas could be concerned with an effort-
based evaluation of an option, in analogy to a highly deliberative δ-decision making system 
mediating the selection of temporally delayed, but larger monetary reward (McClure et al., 
2004,  2007).  However,  additional  evidence  is  needed  to  further  underline  the  putative 
involvement  of  the  classical  cognitive  control  regions  comprising  the  δ-decision  making    General Discussion       
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system in processes concerned with effort based valuation. To this end, one could investigate 
whether or not these regions also predict the choice of options that are associated with a 
comparably higher previous effort investment in a decision making experiment. In general, to 
further  specify  regions  involved  in  effort  based  value  computation,  behaviorally  derived 
preference  curves  analogous  to  decision  making  experiments  concerned  with  temporal 
discounting (Kable & Glimcher, 2007) could be established. These preference curves should 
be  based  on  effort-based  choices,  i.e.,  they  should  depict  how  the  subjective  value  of  a 
decision option varies with effort expenditure for each individual. Through this, it would be 
possible  to  identify  neural  activity  that  correlates  with  the  effort-based  subjective  value. 
Furthermore, they could indicate according to which function invested effort modulates the 
evaluation  of  outcomes,  i.e.,  which  amount  of  effort  investment  makes  a  difference  for 
subjective outcome evaluation, as well as for effort based value computation in the brain, 
respectively.  
Experimentally, it is not trivial how to convert choice behavior into how hard subjects will 
work  for  an  option.  Practically,  in  order  to  investigate  effort-based  choice  behavior,  the 
multitrial reward schedule task could be transformed into a free choice task in which each 
transition to the next action step is subjected to the decision whether or not the participant is 
sufficiently motivated to act  or not.  How hard subjects  are willing to work for a  certain 
amount of money, i.e., the number of actions steps until they decide to abandon a course of 
actions leading to a prespecified reward, should reflect the subjective effort-based reward 
value. Hereby, if the hypothesis proves correct, the decision to continue to invest should be 
governed  by  cognitive  control  regions  associated  with  the  δ-decision  making  system. 
Additionally, an experiment like this would provide other valuable evidence concerning the 
neuronal underpinnings of the sunk cost effect, as the literature has focused on the persistence 
in  goal  pursuit  as  another  variation  of  this  phenomenon  next  to  increased  allocation  of 
resources (Fantino, 2004).  
Another  hypothesis  concerning  the  role  of  the  regions  activated  after  increased  effort 
expenditure  in  the  second  study  is  that  they  reflect  a  facilitation  of  cognitive  processes 
required  for  goal  achievement  of  the  current  task.  To  find  additional  evidence  for  this 
hypothesis, one could investigate how subjects perform a typical cognitive control task, e.g., a 
working  memory  tasks  (e.g.,  Stelzel,  Basten,  Montag,  Reuter,  &  Fiebach,  2009)  under 
differential  expectancies  of  monetary  rewards  for  correct  performance.  Critically,  these 
rewards should be associated with differential effort expenditure, for example in a practice    General Discussion       
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session  before  the  experiment,  such  that  two  factors,  i.e.,  (a)  memory  load  and  (b) 
motivational incentive due to previous effort expenditure can be orthogonally varied. The 
main effects could demonstrate whether or not effort-based incentives recruit some of the 
same neural networks that underlie the working memory task. Through the identification of 
areas of interaction evidence could be provided whether or not previous effort investment can 
modulate task related activity to assure goal achievement. 
 
      Deutsche Zusammenfassung       
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
72 
 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Theoretischer Hintergrund 
Derzeit  besteht  im  Bereich  der  Neurowissenschaften  ein  großes  Interesse  daran 
aufzuklären,  auf  welche  Weise  verschiedene  Variablen  die  Wertigkeit  eines  erwarteten 
Handlungsziels  beeinflussen  bzw.  welche  Hirnregionen  an  der  Kodierung  der  Wertigkeit 
eines Handlungsziels beteiligt sind. Die Wertigkeit eines Handlungsziels ist beispielsweise 
immer dann relevant, wenn eine Entscheidung zwischen zwei Handlungsoptionen getroffen 
werden muss.  
Prinzipiell  können  an  der  Zuschreibung  von  Wertigkeit  zwei  unterschiedliche 
Einflussfaktoren  beteiligt  sein.  Zum  einen  kommt  es  darauf  an,  in  welchem  Kontext 
Handlungsoptionen  präsentiert  werden.  Die  Tendenz  kontextuelle  Merkmale,  das  heißt 
Merkmale der aktuellen Situation, in den Bewertungsprozess mit einzubeziehen kann man 
sich leicht vor Augen führen indem man sich die folgenden Fragen stellt: „Würde es mir 
leichter fallen, einen neuen Fernseher zu kaufen, wenn ich an dem gleichen Tag schon ein 
neues Haus  gekauft hätte?“ oder „Würden ich diesen Fernseher eher kaufen, wenn er als 
heruntergesetzt gekennzeichnet wäre?“. Die meisten Menschen bejahen solche Fragen, was 
zeigt, dass Optionen weniger absolut, sondern eher relativ in Abhängigkeit des jeweiligen 
Bezugsrahmens bewertet werden. Studien weisen darauf hin, dass der orbitofrontale Cortex 
(OFC;  Watanabe  &  Sakagami,  2007)  und  der  laterale  präfrontale  Cortex  (LPFC;  Padoa-
Schioppa, 2009) an der Repräsentation des wahrgenommenen Wertes in Abhängigkeit von 
Merkmalen der Situation beteiligt sind.  
Unabhängig  von  den  Merkmalen  der  jeweiligen  Situation  wird  die  wahrgenommene 
Wertigkeit  einer  Entscheidungsoption  auch  absolut  durch  Parameter  beeinflusst  wie  den 
erwarteten  Geldbetrag  (die  „Belohnungshöhe“),  die  Wahrscheinlichkeit,  mit  der  ein 
bestimmtes Ereignis eintritt, die Dauer bis zur Belohnung, und die Anstrengung, die man 
aufbringen  muss,  um  etwas  zu  erhalten.  Diese  Parameter  werden  unter  dem  Begriff 
„Entscheidungsvariablen“  zusammengefasst.  Hirnregionen,  die  an  der  Kodierung  von 
Wertigkeit anhand dieser Entscheidungsvariablen beteiligt sind, sind klassische belohnungs-
assoziierte  Areale  wie  das  dopaminerge  Mittelhirn  (Waelti  et  al,  2001),  das  Striatum 
(Hollerman et al., 1998) und der orbitofrontale Cortex (Trembley & Schultz, 2000). Weitere    Deutsche Zusammenfassung       
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beteiligte Regionen sind  der posteriore  mediale  präfrontale Cortex (pMFC;  Walton et  al., 
2006), der laterale PFC (Kim et al., 2009) sowie prämotorische Areale (Roesch & Olson, 
2003).  Die  meisten  neurowissenschaftlichen  Studien  zur  neuronalen  Repräsentation  der 
Wertigkeit  eines  Handlungsziels  beziehen  sich  auf  diese  Entscheidungsvariablen.  Bisher 
liegen jedoch kaum neuronale Untersuchungen vor bezüglich zweier anderer Variablen, die 
ebenfalls  den  erwarteten  Wert  eines  Handlungsergebnisses  beeinflussen.  Das  sind  (a)  die 
Nähe zu dem erwarteten Ziel  und (b) die bisher investierte Anstrengung, um ein  Ziel zu 
erreichen. Die bisher investierte Anstrengung kann sowohl als Entscheidungsvariable gesehen 
werden, die den erwarteten Wert absolut verändert, als auch als ein kontextuelles Merkmal 
der Situation, das als Bezugsrahmen für eine relative Zuschreibung von Wertigkeit dient. Das 
Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es zu untersuchen, wie die Nähe zum Ziel und die bisher 
investierte  Anstrengung  Gehirnregionen  beeinflussen,  die  mit  der  Repräsentation  von 
Wertigkeit im Zusammenhang stehen. Dazu führten wir zwei fMRT-Studien durch, in denen 
wir  eine  klassische  Belohnungs-Antizipationsaufgabe  (Monetary  Incentive  Delay  (MID)  - 
Aufgabe; Knutson et al., 2001) in zwei unterschiedliche Versionen eines „Multitrial Reward 
Schedule“  Paradigmas  integriert  haben  (Shidara  &  Richmond,  2002;  Ichihara-Takeda  & 
Funahashi, 2006).  
 
Studie 1 – Die neuronale Repräsentation der Zielnähe 
Zur Untersuchung der Zielnähe mussten die Probanden jeweils vier aufeinanderfolgende 
MID-Aufgaben pro Reward Schedule durchführen. Das bedeutet, dass ein Multitrial Reward 
Schedule immer aus vier MID-Aufgaben bestand. Der kritische Unterschied zwischen den 
Multitrial  Reward  Schedules  bestand  darin,  dass  sie  unter  zwei  unterschiedlichen 
Belohnungskontingenzen  dargeboten  wurden:  In  dem  verzögerten  Schedule  erhielten  die 
Probanden eine Belohnung nach der erfolgreichen Bearbeitung von vier aufeinanderfolgenden 
MID-Aufgaben,  in  dem  direkten  Schedule  dagegen  nach  jeder  korrekten  MID-Aufgabe 
innerhalb  einer  vierer  Sequenz  (siehe  Abbildung  1,  Kapitel  4.2.2).  Wurde  in  einem 
verzögerten  Schedule  ein  Fehler  gemacht,  so  wurde  die  MID-Aufgaben  Sequenz 
abgebrochen, und es erfolgte keine monetäre Belohnung. In einem direkten Schedule wurde 
lediglich die aktuelle MID-Aufgabe nicht belohnt, der Schedule an sich lief danach mit der 
nächsten  MID-Aufgabe  weiter.  Zusätzlich  manipulierten  wir  die  Belohnungshöhe.  In  der 
niedrigen Belohnungsbedingung konnten die Probanden entweder 5 Euro-Cents pro korrekter 
MID-Aufgabe (direkte Kontingezbedingung) oder 20 Euro-Cents nach vier korrekten MID-   Deutsche Zusammenfassung       
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Aufgaben (verzögerte Kontingenzbedingung) bekommen. In der hohen Belohnungsbedingung 
konnten sie sich 20 Euro-Cents pro korrekter MID-Aufgabe (direkte Kontingezbedingung) 
und  80  Euro-Cents  für  vier  korrekte  MID-Aufgaben  (verzögerte  Kontingenzbedingung) 
verdienen. Daraus resultierte ein 2 x 2 x 4 Paradigma (verzögerte vs. direkte Kontingenz; 
hohe vs. niedrige monetäre Belohnung; 4 Positionen pro Schedule).  
Effekte  der  Zielnähe  wurden  identifiziert  über  eine  Interaktionsanalyse  zwischen 
Kontingenz- und Positionseffekten, das heißt über die Identifikation von Arealen, die eine 
stärker ansteigende Aktivität über die Positionen in der verzögerten im Vergleich zur direkten 
Bedingung aufwiesen. Shidara und Richmond (2002) hatten zuvor in einer Studie mit einem 
ähnlichen  Design  Neurone  im  caudalen  motor  Areal  (CMA)  bei  Affen  gefunden,  dessen 
Aktivität über die einzelnen Handlungsschritte hinweg durch die Nähe zum Ziel moduliert 
wurde.  Aufgrund  dieses  Befundes  erwarteten  wir,  Effekte  der  Zielnähe  in  der  rostralen 
cingulären Zone (RCZ) zu finden, die das homologe menschliche Areal zur CMA von Affen 
ist (Picard & Strick, 2001).  
Hypothesenkonform  zeigte  sich  für  die  RCZ  eine  signifikante  Interaktion  zwischen 
Kontingenz und Position, genauer eine sukzessiv ansteigende Aktivität über die Positionen 
hinweg, das heißt in Abhängigkeit der Nähe zum verzögerten Ziel. Weiterhin zeigte sich, dass 
die RCZ kontingent zur Zielnähe eine erhöhte Konnektivität zu motorisch-relatierten Arealen 
wie dem dorsalen prämotorischen Cortex und dem Putamen aufweist.  
Weiterhin  wurde  geprüft,  welches  Hirnareal  auf  die  Erwartung  eines  identischen 
Geldbetrages nach hoher versus keiner investierten Anstrengung reagiert. Dies war möglich 
durch einen Vergleich der vierten Position in dem niedrig belohnten verzögerten Schedule mit 
der vierten Position in dem hoch belohnten direkten Schedule (verzögert niedrig 4. Position 
vs. direkt hoch 4. Position). In diesen Bedingungen erwarteten die Probanden jeweils eine 
Belohnung  von  20  Euro-Cents.  Der  einzige  Unterschied  war  die  Anzahl  der  bisherigen 
Handlungen, d. h. die bisher investierte Anstrengung, die nötig war, um die 20 Euro-Cents zu 
erhalten.  In  der  verzögerten  Bedingung  war  die  korrekte  Ausführung  der  drei 
vorangegangenen  Handlungen  die  Voraussetzung  für  den  Erhalt  der  Belohnung.  In  der 
direkten Bedingung spielten die vorangegangenen MID-Aufgaben keine Rolle für den Erhalt 
der Belohnung. Dieser Vergleich ergab einen Aktivitätsunterschied in einem weiter anterior 
gelegenen Teilbereich der rostralen cingulären Zone. Interessanterweise zeigte dieses Areal in 
einer Region of Interest Analyse ebenfalls eine signifikante Interaktion zwischen Kontingenz    Deutsche Zusammenfassung       
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und  Position,  das  heißt  einen  parametrischen  Anstieg  der  Aktivität  in  Abhängigkeit  zur 
Zielnähe.    
Insgesamt  weisen  diese  Befunde  darauf  hin,  dass  die  RCZ  eine  entscheidende  Rolle 
innehat für die Kontrolle sequenzieller Handlungsstufen, die auf eine verzögerte Belohnung 
ausgerichtet  sind.  Dies  erreicht  diese  Region  unter  anderem  durch  das  Vermitteln  von 
belohnungsbezogener  Information  an  motorische  Regionen,  die  für  die 
Handlungsvorbereitung  zuständig  sind.  Diese  Kontrollfunktion  scheint  auf  der 
kontinuierlichen Aktualisierung des Wertes einer Handlungsstufe in der RCZ zu basieren, der 
sowohl von der aktuellen Zielnähe als auch von der bisher investierten Anstrengung bestimmt 
wird.  
 
Studie  2  –  Die  neuronale  Repräsentation  der  bisher  investierten 
Anstrengung 
Die  erste  Studie  ergab  zum  ersten  Mal  Hinweise  darauf,  wie  die  bereits  investierte 
Anstrengung im Hinblick auf ein Handlungsziel im menschlichen Gehirn repräsentiert wird. 
Demgegenüber  wurde  in  anderen  Forschungsfeldern  wie  in  der  Sozialpsychologie  schon 
häufig gezeigt, dass die bisher investierte Anstrengung einen substantiellen Einfluss auf die 
Evaluation eines erwarteten Handlungsergebnisses ausübt (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Navarro & 
Fantino,  2005).  Da  bisher  kaum  Evidenz  vorliegt,  welche  Hirnregionen  durch  die  vorher 
investierte Anstrengung beeinflusst werden, hatten wir in Studie 2 das Ziel dies genauer zu 
untersuchen.  Bisher  deutete  neben  den  Befunden  aus  Studie  1  außerdem  eine  reine 
Verhaltensstudie  mit  Affen  darauf  hin,  dass  der  wahrgenommene  Wert  einer  Handlung 
innerhalb eines Multitrial Reward Schedules von den bisher abgeschlossenen Handlungen, 
also der bereits investierten Anstrengung, beeinflusst wird (La Camera & Richmond, 2008).  
Wie in Studie 1 wurden   MID-Aufgaben in  verzögerte und direkte Multitrial Reward 
Schedules  integriert.  Der  kritische  Unterschied  zur  ersten  Studie  bestand  darin,  dass  die 
Schedules aus einer variierenden Anzahl von MID-Aufgaben bestanden. In der verzögerten 
Bedingung erhielten die Probanden eine monetäre Belohnung von 18 Euro-Cents nach der 
fehlerfreien Ausführung von einer, zwei oder drei aufeinanderfolgenden MID-Aufgaben. In 
der direkten Bedingung erhielten sie 18 Euro-Cents nach jeder fehlerfreien MID-Aufgabe,    Deutsche Zusammenfassung       
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unabhängig von der Anzahl der MID-Aufgaben pro Schedule (siehe Abbildung 7, Kapitel 
5.2.2).  
Die variable Länge der Schedules hatte im Vergleich zur ersten Studie, in der immer vier 
Handlungsschritte auf dem Weg zur Zielerreichung ausgeführt werden mussten, eine erhöhte 
Anforderung an allgemeine kognitive Kontrollfunktionen zur Folge. In vielen Studien zum 
Zusammenhang zwischen Belohnungshöhe und kognitiver Kontrolle wurde festgestellt, dass 
eine höhere Belohnungserwartung während der  Bearbeitung von kognitiv  anspruchsvollen 
Aufgaben die Performanz verbessert und die Aktivität in aufgabenbezogenen Arealen erhöht 
(z. B. Small et al., 2005; Adcock et al., 2006; Krawczyk et al., 2007; Locke & Braver, 2008). 
Da die investierte Anstrengung ebenfalls die subjektive Belohnungserwartung erhöht (Arkes 
& Ayton, 1999), erwarteten wir, dass  typische kognitive Kontrollregionen wie der laterale 
präfrontale Cortex, der posteriore mediale frontale Cortex und der parietale Cortex (Wager et 
al.,  2004;  Owen  et  al.,  2005)  bei  dem  Vergleich  zwischen  hoher  und  keiner  investierten 
Anstrengung bei der Erwartung einer identischen Belohnungshöhe signifikant erhöht sind. 
Der Einfluss der bisher investierten Anstrengung wurde analog zur Studie 1 untersucht, indem 
die letzten Handlungen der verzögerten mit den letzten Handlungen der direkten Multitrial 
Reward  Schedules  miteinander  verglichen  wurden.  Wie  in  der  ersten  Studie  spielten  die 
vorangegangenen  Handlungen  in  den  direkten  Schedules  keine  Rolle  für  den  Erhalt  der 
Belohnung. In der verzögerten Bedingung war die korrekte Ausführung der vorangehenden 
MID-Aufgaben die Voraussetzung für den Erhalt der Belohnung. Das bedeutet, dass sich die 
letzten  Handlungen  in  beiden  Kontingenzbedingungen  nur  durch  die  bisher  investierte 
Anstrengung eine Belohnung von 18 Euro-Cents zu verdienen unterschieden. 
Entsprechend unserer Hypothesen fanden wir eine Modulation durch die bisher investierte 
Anstrengung  in  einem  weit  verzweigten  Netzwerk  an  kortikalen  Regionen,  die 
klassischerweise  mit  kognitiven  Kontrollfunktionen  in  Zusammenhang  gebracht  werden. 
Dazu gehörte der LPFC (BA9, BA44, BA45, BA10), der posteriore mPFC inklusive der RCZ 
und das supplementär-motorische Areal. Zusätzlich war die Aktivität im parietalen Cortex 
und der anterioren Insula erhöht.  
Ein  weiterer  Unterschied  zur  ersten  Studie  bestand  darin,  dass  verzögerte  und  direkt 
belohnte Multitrial Reward Schedules in Blöcken von jeweils etwa vier Minuten präsentiert 
wurden.  Diese  geblockte  Darbietungsweise  ermöglichte  es  uns  weiterhin,  verzögerte  und 
direkte Multitrial Reward Schedules miteinander zu vergleichen, die jeweils aus nur einer    Deutsche Zusammenfassung       
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MID-Aufgabe bestanden. Diese unterschieden sich also lediglich bezüglich des Kontextes, in 
dem sie präsentiert wurden. Genauer gesagt ist das Risiko Kosten zu versenken, das heißt 
bisher investierte Anstrengung zu verlieren, höher im verzögerten als im direkten Kontext. 
Mit diesem Vergleich sollte demnach geprüft werden, ob der posteriore LPFC und der OFC, 
zwei Areale die schon zuvor mit der Repräsentation von kontextabhängiger Wertigkeit in 
Verbindung gebracht wurden (Watanabe & Sakagami, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009), auch an 
der Kodierung des Kontextes selbst auf der Basis der bisher investierten Anstrengung beteiligt 
sind.  
Der Vergleich von einzelnen Handlungen, die entweder im verzögerten oder im direkten 
Kontext  präsentiert  wurden,  erzielte  eine  hypothesenkonforme  Aktivierung  im  posterioren 
LPFC und im OFC. 
Die  Befunde  der  zweiten  Studie  lassen  darauf  schließen,  dass  sich  die  investierte 
Anstrengung  im  Hinblick  auf  ein  Handlungsziel  auf  die  Bereitstellung  von  allgemeinen 
kognitiven Ressourcen auswirkt. Außerdem scheinen der posteriore LPFC und der OFC die 
motivationalen  Kontextmerkmale  einer  Situation  auch  dann  zu  repräsentieren,  wenn  sich 
diese auf das Risiko des Verlustes von bisher investierter Anstrengung beziehen.  
 
Zusammenfassende Diskussion 
Die vorliegenden Studien befassten sich mit dem Einfluss der Zielnähe und der bisher 
investierten Anstrengung im Hinblick auf die neuronale Repräsentation der Wertigkeit eines 
Handlungsziels.  Außerdem  wurde  untersucht,  inwieweit  das  Risiko  die  bisher  investierte 
Anstrengung zu verlieren als motivationales Merkmal der Situation neuronal kodiert wird. 
Entsprechend der vorab formulierten Hypothesen zeigte sich, dass die rostrale cinguläre 
Zone, analog zum caudalen motorischen Areal im Affen, den erwarteten Wert kontingent zur 
Nähe zum Ziel in einer Sequenz von Routinehandlungen repräsentiert. Neuere Studien, die 
die  Rolle  der  RCZ  bezüglich  der  Bewertung  eines  Handlungsergebnisses  zu  spezifizieren 
versuchen,  schlagen  vor,  dass  diese  auf  der  Berechnung  des  Wertes  der  spezifischen 
Handlung  beruht,  mit  der  ein  Ergebnis  erzielt  werden  kann  (für  einen  Überblick  siehe 
Rushworth  et  al.,  2004).  Die  schrittweise  ansteigende  Aktivität  der  RCZ  könnte  damit 
funktionell  relevant  sein  für  die  Absicherung  der  Persistenz  in  einem    Deutsche Zusammenfassung       
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Routinehandlungsverlauf, der auf eine verzögerte Belohnung ausgerichtet ist (Pears et al., 
2003). 
Die bisher investierte Anstrengung kann auf zwei verschiedene Arten den erwarteten Wert 
einer Handlung beeinflussen. Auf der einen Seite kann die bisher investierte Anstrengung im 
Sinne einer Entscheidungsvariable den wahrgenommenen Wert einer identischen Belohnung 
verändern. Im Rahmen von routinemäßigen Handlungssequenzen scheint die Aktivität der 
rostralen cingulären Zone die Wertigkeit nicht nur kontingent zur Zielnähe, sondern auch in 
Abhängigkeit der bisher investierten Anstrengung zu kodieren. Dieser Befund stimmt mit der 
Annahme überein, dass die RCZ eine höhere Anzahl von Entscheidungsvariablen (wie bspw. 
die Belohnungshöhe, oder die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein bestimmtes Belohnung eintritt) 
kodiert  als  jede  andere  Regionen  im  frontalen  Cortex  (Kennerley  et  al.,  2009a).  In  einer 
Sequenz von einer variablen Anzahl von Handlungen bis zur Zielerreichung scheint sich die 
bisher investierte Anstrengung im Sinne einer gesteigerten allgemeinen Handlungskontrolle 
auszuwirken.  Es  sind  jedoch  weitere  Studien  nötig,  um  alternative 
Interpretationsmöglichkeiten ausschließen zu können.  
Das  Risiko  des  Verlustes  der  bisher  investierten  Anstrengung  kann  außerdem  ein 
kontextuelles  Merkmal  der  Situation  darstellen,  das  als  Bezugsrahmen  für  eine  relative 
Evaluation  des  erwarteten  Wertes  dient.  Der  orbitofrontale  Cortex  und  der  posteriore 
dorsolaterale Cortex scheinen an der Aufrechterhaltung dieses Bezugsrahmens beteiligt zu 
sein.  Interessanterweise  wurde  der  OFC  kürzlich  auch  mit  der  Fähigkeit  in  Verbindung 
gebracht, einer relativen Wertzuschreibung entgegenzuwirken. Diese Fähigkeit ist potentiell 
von hoher Wichtigkeit in realen Entscheidungssituationen, da die zu hohe Anfälligkeit für 
ökonomisch irrelevante Entscheidungskriterien schwerwiegende Konsequenzen haben kann. 
Ein Beispiel hierfür scheint der Bau der Concorde zu sein. Offensichtlich waren die damit 
verbundenen mittelmäßigen finanziellen Aussichten schon vor Beendigung der Konstruktion 
bekannt. Allerdings entschloss man sich nichtsdestotrotz den Bau fortzusetzen, da man schon 
„zu viel investiert hatte“ um  das  Projekt  wieder abzubrechen und damit den Verlust  von 
bisherigen Investitionen zu riskieren (Teger, 1980).  
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